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THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
TRANSFORMED: THE RISE
OF A PUBLIC PLACE
EXEMPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Lewis R. Katz*
The Supreme Court in recent years has aggressively pursued restrictions on a per-
son's Constitutional protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. Perhaps no
better example exists of the radically changing fourth amendment analysis than the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement This exception allows a law en-
forcement official with probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is hidden in
a vehicle to search that vehicle without obtaining a search warrant This Article ex-
plores the genesis and unchecked growth of the automobile exception from a neces-
sary outgrowth of the exigencies ofprotecting police officers and preventing tampering
with evidence, to a confusing morass of interchangeably applied and contradictory
rationales and unworkable, "bright-line" rules. In examining three 1985 Supreme
Court cases, this Article identifies the contradictions and two highly disturbing trends
in fourth amendment analysis: that the proponent of warrant protections has the
burden ofproving their benefit over law enforcement costs, and, the possible first steps
towards a general, public place exception to the warrant requirement
INTRODUCTION
DURING THE fifteen-year life of the Burger Court, a principal
goal of the emerging conservative majority has been the reduc-
tion or elimination of the role of the fourth amendment1 in criminal
* John C. Hutchins Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. A.B., Queens College (1950); J.D., Indiana University at Bloomington (1963).
The author thanks J. Andrew Hoerner for his editorial assistance.
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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litigation. The Court has ruled with growing consistency against
claims of fourth amendment violations,2 using either a scalpel or an
axe to excise the amendment's guarantees. One prime method of
excising these guarantees is the enhancement of exceptions from the
fourth amendment warrant requirement.3 Less than two decades
ago the Supreme Court proclaimed that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, subject only to
narrowly prescribed exceptions.4 While the Court continues to pay
lip service to this catechism,5 its actions have transformed that pol-
icy into an historic relic, at least when the search takes place away
from a home.6
No better example of the warrant requirement's demise exists
than in the area of automobile searches. For fifteen years the
Supreme Court has given, nearly every time, the requested exemp-
tion from the fourth amendment warrant requirement when the ob-
ject of a search is an automobile and, recently, a container found in
an automobile.' Warrants for searches of automobiles are on the
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See generally Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. Rv. 257 (1984) (discussing the current Supreme Court trend to limit the scope of
the fourth amendment).
3. See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (police officer needs no
warrant to monitor arrestee's movement by remaining at his elbow); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (police may search interior compartments of an automobile and all
containers found therein upon arrest of a car's occupants).
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (search of car taken from
private driveway held unreasonable where there were no exigent circumstances, and it was
not impractical to obtain a warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (fourth
amendment is intended to protect people and their legitimate expectations of privacy).
5. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982) (upholding the search of all
containers found in a vehicle), under the automobile exception, the Court quoted language
from Katz, where it was held that "'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'"
Although Katz is quoted in Ross, the principle of the case was ignored. See also Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1980) (no expectation of privacy in unconcealed objects in auto-
mobile's passenger compartment). See generally Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving Stan-
dards For Warrantless Searches, 74 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172 (1983).
6. The one narrow limitation on the Court's willingness to forego the warrant require-
ment in places other than the home is preserved in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-
11 (1977) (holding fourth amendment prohibits searches in which there is a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy even when in public). See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762
(1979) (following Chadwick).
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (where actual mobility of vehicle
exists, and occupants cannot lawfully be arrested, a warrantless search is justified); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (since an automobile is always capable of being driven
away, its inherent mobility justifies a warrantless search); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,
590 (1974) (warrantless search of an auto is upheld because one has a "lesser expectation of
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verge of absolute extinction.8 The expansion of opportunities for
warrantless searches of motor vehicles results from a coalition of
those Supreme Court Justices who do not believe that requiring a
warrant prior to a search is important 9 and those who ordinarily do,
like Justice Stevens, but who view the automobile as unique, merit-
privacy" in an automobile); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973) (pervasive
governmental regulation of the automobile justifies warrantless search of its interior); United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (general impracticability of obtaining a warrant,
based on the mobility of the vehicle, justifies a warrantless search of all closed containers
which could contain the object of the search found in a lawfully stopped auto).
The one surviving limitation on this trend was established in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 761-63 (1979) (held if probable cause focused on the item before it was placed into
the car, then the item could not be searched without a warrant). Although Robbins v. Cali-
fornia, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), suspended the expansion of the exception for approximately I 1
months, the trend resumed in Ross and was extended to all containers found in a lawfully
stopped car.
8. The remaining limitation on the exception was established in Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 761-63 (1979) (a warrant to search must be obtained if probable cause focuses
on the item prior to its placement into an auto), and reaffirmed in Oklahoma v. Castleberry,
105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985). This limitation is severely threatened by the Supreme Court's most
recent cases, which evince a trend toward sanctioning warrantless searches of any item excit-
ing probable cause in public. Another limitation was established in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 462 (1971) (police may not disregard an obvious, pre-existing
opportunity to obtain a search warrant). This limitation has been preserved by some courts
by invalidating warrantless searches where there was pre-existing probable cause and police
unreasonably delayed in securing a warrant. See, eg., United States v. Harvey, 437 F.2d 1, 3
(5th Cir. 1971); Kaufman v. United States, 453 F.2d 798, 802 (8th Cir. 1971). The limitation
may have been discarded in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593-95 (1974) (scraping paint
from impounded automobile's exterior upheld as violating no expectation of privacy).
9. They are Justices White, Rehnquist, Blackmun and O'Connor. E.g., California v.
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 925 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (Justice
Rehnquist rejects both the exclusionary rule and the judicial preference for warrants, quoting
Justice Stone in McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927), "'A criminal prosecution
is more than a game in which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely
because its officers have not played according to rule.' ").
It is often forgotten that nothing in the Fourth Amendment itself requires that
searches be conducted pursuant to warrants. . [.. "[nemphasizing the warrant
requirement over the reasonableness of the search the Court has 'stood the fourth
amendment on its head' from a historical standpoint."
In emphasizing the warrant requirement the Court has.., not only erected an
edifice without solid foundation but also one with little substance.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 20 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[A] warrant would be routinely
forthcoming in the vast majority of situations where the property has been seized in conjunc-
tion with the valid arrest of a person in a public place. I therefore doubt that requiring the
authorities to go through the formality of obtaining a warrant in this situation would have
much practical effect in protecting Fourth Amendment values."); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 773-74 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (though not a complete repudiation of the
warrant requirement, Justice White's proposed reasonableness test, based on the abstract no-
tion that warrantless searches incident to arrest are inherently reasonable, evinces a lesser
regard for the warrant requirement).
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ing anomalous treatment.10 Even the most liberal wing of the
Supreme Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall, to some extent,
share Justice Stevens' view that automobiles are unique but do not
join in Stevens' approval of the more recent expansions of the auto-
mobile exception.11
Conventional fourth amendment jurisprudence has long pro-
claimed the joint values of protecting the privacy of the individual
and limiting police discretion by requiring judicial approval prior to
a search. Sanction of warrantless intrusions should only be ap-
proved in the presence of genuine exigent circumstances, indicative
of law enforcement interests sufficiently urgent to overwhelm the
values the warrant requirement protects. 12 The Burger Court has
systematically eroded this principle. For automobile searches, the
Court has replaced the exigency requirement with irrebuttably pre-
10. They are Justices Stevens, Powell and Stewart. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420,
448 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens merely restated the Chambers assertion
that searches of automobiles generally involve exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 826 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (although reasonable expectation of privacy
is generally decisive in search cases, "it is essential to have a court opinion in automobile
search cases that provides 'specific guidance to the police and court .... ' ") (emphasis in
original); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 422-28 (1981) (Stewart, J., for the plurality)
(holding that a warrant is required to search a sealed, opaque container, even when found in
an automobile but affirming the automobile exception itself "even where neither mobility nor
any exigency is present").
11. While not joining Justice Stevens' approval of the more recent expansions of the
automobile exception, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the majority in Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), which paved the way for the current treatment of automobiles.
Moreover, the two have seemingly never recognized the mischievousness of the decision in
Chambers which opened the door to the later decisions which they have opposed. While
Chambers did not make succeeding cases inevitable, they were made probable by the founda-
tion laid in Chambers.
12. Adherence to judicial process prior to an intrusion has been deemed to provide the
only effective guarantee of the fourth amendment's assurance that the American people
should be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, the Court has not
treated the warrant requirement as a mere technicality or as a nuisance to be avoided on the
barest showing of inconvenience. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)
(mere police inconvenience does not justify foregoing warrant requirement); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (warrant process interposes the impartial judg-
ment of a judicial officer between the citizen and the police); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 356 (1967) (warrant process provides an objective determination of probable cause with
the imposition of limits on the scope of an intrusion). As stated by the Court in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948):
[T]he informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue
warrants as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution
are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to
make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by
resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty
officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons ac-
cused of crime.
(quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
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sumed, fictitious exigencies; fictions that seldom seem to fit the ac-
tual facts of the cases. Alternatively, the Court allows the effects of
long past exigencies to linger and extinguish obvious privacy inter-
ests. The purported justifications for these incursions not only have
been unsound but incoherent. By applying diverse justifications for
not obtaining a warrant and shifting justifications from case to
case,13 the present Court exploits this "labyrinth of uncertainty"14
to negate constitutional restraints on police behavior.
Three 1985 decisions illustrate and continue this practice. In
United States v. Johns,'5 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
upheld the warrantless search of a package stored in a government
warehouse. The Court found the search exempt from the warrant
requirement under the automobile exception even though the pack-
age had been seized by federal agents from a vehicle three days
before it was searched.16 Notwithstanding the majority's claim that
the holding has limits, 7 Johns stands for the proposition that once
an item is taken from an automobile it will be treated as though it
were just removed from the automobile for purposes of determining
fourth amendment questions. This decision totally undermines the
same fourth amendment jurisprudence referred to by the Court af-
firming the value of judicial approval prior to a search. 8
13. The Court has applied the following justifications: a) mobility, b) diminished expec-
tation of privacy, and c) impracticability of obtaining a warrant. The Court has employed a
Procrustean approach, squeezing, stretching or discarding numerous rationales to suit its
purposes. In the following cases, mobility as a rationale for warrantless searches appears,
disappears and finally appears once again. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 152 (1925)
(actual mobility of the vehicle constitutes exigency justifying warrantless search); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1970) (inherent mobility-that "someone" could drive a
vehicle away justifies a warrantless search); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588-92 (1974)
(diminished expectation of privacy in the exterior of one's vehicle allows warrantless search);
Ross v. United States, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 (1982) (general impracticability of obtaining a
warrant based on inherent mobility of vehicle justifies a warrantless search); California v.
Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070-71 (1985) (the pervasive regulation of motor vehicles and ready
mobility of a motor home justify a warrantless search of the motor home's interior); United
States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881, 885-86 (1985) (validating warrantless search absent mobility
on general notions of impracticability).
1 14. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 7.2, at 509 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as
SEARCH & SEIZURE].
15. 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
16. "There is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur contempora-
neously with its lawful seizure." Id. at 885 (citing Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per
curiam); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
17. "[W]e do not suggest that police officers may indefinitely retain possession of a vehi-
cle and its contents before they complete a vehicle search." United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct.
881, 887 (1985) (citations omitted).
18. See supra note 12.
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In California v. Carney,19 the Court upheld the warrantless
search of a motor home parked on a public street. The Court was
confronted directly with a situation in which a mechanical applica-
tion of the automobile exception would involve a violation of the
privacy interest in the home, an interest that even the staunchest
opponents of the fourth amendment would ordinarily view as wor-
thy of protection.20 Neither exigent circumstances nor mere im-
practicability2" could justify the search in Carney. Consequently,
the Court momentarily abandoned impracticability and once again
relied upon the inherent mobility of automobiles as a justification
for the exception.22 By ignoring the substantial privacy interest in
one's home simply because the residence is potentially mobile, the
majority has elevated the automobile exception above the interests
which the general rule requiring a warrant is intended to protect.23
Carney demonstrates the Court's continued willingness to use the
automobile exception to justify searches which would otherwise
clearly be deemed impermissible.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Oklahoma v. Castleberry24 af-
firmed without opinion one of the last, scant limitations on the au-
tomobile exception. That limitation, however, is so anomalous in
light of the other automobile search cases that clarification is des-
perately needed. In 1985, the automobile exception continued to
triumph over the warrant requirement, 25 well on the way to fulfil-
ling former Justice Stewart's concern that the word "automobile" is
about to become "a talisman in whose presence the fourth amend-
19. 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
20. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (government sought to distin-
guish homes, offices and conversations as lying at the core of the fourth amendment, from
everything else).
21. Indeed, at the time of the first search, conducted ostensibly as a "protective sweep,"
the suspect was safely in custody. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 610, 668 P.2d 807, 814,
914 Cal. Rptr. 500, 507 (1983). "None of the officers testified that they had any reason to
believe there were other suspects inside [the mobile home]." Id. at 613, 668 P.2d at 816, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 509. Similarly, the subsequent warrantless search at the station house was un-
justified because the arrest eliminated the threat that the vehicle or its contents could be put
out of reach of a judicially approved search.
22. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court held that the actual
mobility of the vehicle, and thus its capacity to be driven away with the evidence inside,
justified a warrantless search on the spot. However, in Carney, no mobility threat existed
because the defendant was under arrest and was going to be transported to the police station.
23. The dissenting Justice Stevens stressed: "The Court errs. . .[by] accord[ing] prior-
ity to an exception rather than to the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits imposed by
prior cases." California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. 105 S. Ct. 379 (1985).
25. See supra note 8.
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ment fades away and disappears."26
The decisions in Johns and Carney are a total betrayal of the
Court's traditional catechism that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable. Decisions have been rendered which weaken con-
trols upon searches and seizures in violation of basic fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence and truths, while the Court quotes those truths
and purports to reaffirm their continuing validity. The activist ma-
jority has seemingly substituted a political agenda in place of consti-
tutional theory.27 For decades, Supreme Court justices have chided
each other for their lack of consistency when deciding fourth
amendment issues.2 ' That inconsistency has been exacerbated by
the new activist majority's strenuous efforts to dissolve established
fourth amendment restraints. 29 Nowhere has the inconsistency
26. Castleberry lacks precedential value, coming on a tie vote during Justice Powell's
absence. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910) (tie votes carry no precedential
value); Etting v. President, Directors and Co. of Bank, 24 U.S. 59 (1826).
Not discussed is United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985), which involved the
search of an automobile, but rather than relying on the automobile exception, focused upon
the proper length of an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-26 (1968)
(police having reasonable apprehension of danger may conduct "stop and frisk" short of
arrest, limited by the exigencies of the situation). Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
461-62 (1971).
27. See infra note 31.
28. Reluctantly concurring in the judgment in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981), Justice Powell lamented that "the law of search and seizure with respect to
automobiles is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has
held previously, let alone on how these cases should be decided." Id. at 430 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Robbins consisted of no less than five separate opinions. In New York v. Bel-
ton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), decided on the same day as Robbins, dissenting Justice Brennan
accused the majority of disregarding the facts, ignoring precedent and principle and
"adopt[ing] a fiction." Belton, 453 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), Justice Harlan, dissenting from the Court's sanctioning of a
warrantless search based on the "inherent mobility" of an automobile, opined that the
Court's great step forward was "seriously at odds with generally applied Fourth Amendment
principles." Chambers, 399 U.S. at 65, (Harlan, J., dissenting). Finally, in Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), Justice Rehnquist wrote: "[Tihe decisions of this Court deal-
ing with the constitutionality of warrantless searches, especially when those searches are of
vehicles, suggest that this branch of the law is something less than a seamless web." Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. at 440.
29. Several Justices complain that the Court has seemingly gone out of its way to ad-
dress fourth amendment issues. For instance, in Carney, Justice Stevens, joined by Brennan
and Marshall, wrote:
The Court's decision to forge ahead has established a rule. . . that is to be followed
by the entire nation. If the Court had merely allowed the decision below to stand, it
would have only governed searches... in a single State ....
Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted the natural
growth and refinement of alternative principles."
California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2073 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 759 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("I continue to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately reached out
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been more apparent than in the reconstituted theoretical justifica-
tions tendered to explain the transformation of the automobile ex-
ception from a limited exception to a general exemption standing
alone without reason or principle. Different rationales have been
offered to explain the exception's existence, but each successive ex-
pansion has outstripped the theoretical basis advanced to support
the prior escalation, requiring the development of additional and
new theoretical and strained underpinnings.30
The automobile exception knows virtually no bounds and
clearly cannot continue to be tied to the automobile itself. For ex-
ample, the Carney Court's decision to ignore the privacy expecta-
tion in one's dwelling seems to derive from the presence of the
vehicle on a public street 31 and intimates an approval of the public
place, probable cause exception previously rejected by the Court in
United States v. Chadwick.32 The deference shown to police con-
venience in the automobile exception cases cannot be explained by
the peculiar nature and mobility of vehicles because these factors
had been neutralized prior to the searches in Carney and all of the
other critical cases of the past fifteen years. On the other hand, the
deference to police convenience does reflect the skepticism that the
Court has in the value of requiring police to secure a warrant before
searching an item seized outside of a home.33
to decide a constitutional question"); United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1596-97 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (regarding the interest in providing law enforcement guidance
through the writing of fourth amendment opiniong
as paramount would support the wholesale adoption of a practice of rendering advi-
sory opinions at the request of the Executive-a practice the Court abjured at the
beginning of our history. We have, instead, opted for a policy ofjudicial restraint-
of studiously avoiding the unneccessary adjudication of constitutional questions.
(footnote omitted)); Florida v. Rodriguez, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
We do not have. . . supervisory responsibility to correct mistakes that are bound
to occur in the thousands of state tribunals throughout the land. The unusual ac-
tion the Court takes today illustrates how far the Court may depart from its princi-
pal mission when it becomes transfixed by the spectre of a drug courier escaping the
punishment that is his due.
Rodriguez, 105 S. Ct. at 311.
30. See supra note 13.
31. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985). Chief Justice Burger states:
Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would
be required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the vehicle is readily
mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed,
whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public
road.
Id. at 2071 n.3.
32. 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977) (items manifesting owner's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy are due fourth amendment protection and require warrant for search once they are
reduced to police control, absent an emergency).
33. See supra note 9.
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This Article will discuss the scope and development of the auto-
mobile exception and its radical extension in Johns and Carney, the
limitation upon the exception narrowly affirmed in Castleberry, and
the likely development of the exception and what it portends for the
future of the fourth amendment's warrant clause.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
Despite Justice Stevens' attempt to trace the automobile excep-
tion to the first Congress, this exemption from the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement is a product of the past sixty years. In
that period, the exception has grown from a limited grant of author-
ity to search without a warrant based upon necessity to a broad
general exemption from the warrant process unattended by neces-
sity or even any showing of inconvenience.34
A. The Automobile Exception's Origins
The fourth amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures and requires that "normally searches of pri-
vate property be performed pursuant to a search warrant. '35 Con-
sequently, "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable. 36
The reasonableness of a search should not be judged abstractly, but
rather, by how it conforms to the requirements of the warrant
clause. The fourth amendment contains two, non-alternative requi-
sites to determine reasonableness: that the search be authorized by
a neutral and independent magistrate and that the authorization be
supported by probable cause. The existence of probable cause does
not excuse the absence of a warrant. 37 The critical inquiry is there-
fore to determine the reasonableness of securing a warrant in light
of the facts confronting the police officer.38
34. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Johns stated: "A vehicle lawfully in
police custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains
contraband, and there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless
search." United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881, 885 (1985) (emphasis added).
35. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979).
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original).
37. The Supreme Court has declared warrantless searches unlawful "notwithstanding
facts unquestionably showing probable cause." Id. at 357 (quoting Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)).
38. Circumstances which have seemed relevant to courts include (1) the degree of
urgency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant; . . . (2)
reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed;. . . (3) the possibility
of danger to police officers guarding the site of the contraband while a search war-
rant is sought;. . . (4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are
19861
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American jurisprudence deemed a determination by judicial
processes prior to any government intrusion as the most viable way
to ensure the right of the people to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures.39 Unlike the exclusionary rule, which ini-
tially offers rewards only to the guilty," the warrant process offers
its protection to innocent and guilty alike. Justice Stewart wrote
that "[t]he amendment is designed to prevent, not simply redress,
unlawful police action."41 The purpose of the warrant requirement,
based upon the doctrine that individual freedoms are best preserved
by separation of powers,4" is to interpose the impartial judgment of
a judicial officer between the citizen and the police, to provide an
objective evaluation of probable cause,43 and to insure that limits
are placed upon the scope of an intrusion.' Without the warrant
procedure, individual privacy depends only upon review on a mo-
tion to suppress, "too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar
shortcomings of hindsight judgment."4
aware that the police are on their trail; ... and (5) the ready destructibility of the
contraband ....
United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 833 (1973).
39. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (warrant requirement was colo-
nists' reaction to general warrants and warrantless searches); United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (search with warrant accorded preference in marginal cases over war-
rantless searches).
40. For the role and appropriate scope of the exclusionary rule, see generally, I SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, supra note 14, §§ 1.1 to 1.11, at 3-219; Kamisar, Does (Did)(Should) the Ex-
clusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983).
41. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969).
42. This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual free-
doms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among
the different branches and levels of Government. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping
the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 943-44 (1963), quoted in, United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
43. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); see also supra note 12.
44. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967), the Court stated:
[The arresting officers] were not required, before commencing the search, to present
their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They
were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself to observe precise limits
established in advance by specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the
search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that
had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a
search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a
particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means
consistent with that end.
45. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
The suppression process and the exclusionary rule are open to criticism because they offer
protection only to those who are discovered with reliable evidence of guilt. Those who are
innocent have no comparable relief except protracted civil litigation. Rigorous enforcement
of the warrant requirement, of course, provides protection for the innocent as well as the
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The warrant process may be bypassed legitimately when the
costs associated with securing a warrant, such as a necessary delay,
outweigh the acknowledged benefits.4 Permitted are warrantless
searches and seizures which fit within "a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.47
These exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn,"48 in order to
guarantee that they are "justified by absolute necessity" and do not
become the general rule.49
The government agency seeking exemption from the warrant re-
quirement bears the burden of justifying its failure to obtain a war-
rant 0 and also the scope of its warrantless intrusion. Courts should
accommodate only legitimate exigencies and societal needs to re-
main consistent with these principles.51 Such valid needs include
danger to law enforcement officers and the prevention of destruc-
tion or loss of relevant evidence.52 The warrant requirement was
more stalwartly enforced when the Supreme Court held that police
inconvenience would not justify bypassing the warrant process.
Rather, the Court maintained that the state must show "some grave
guilty prior to the intrusion. See generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 190 (1966); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORN. L.Q. 337,
371 (1939).
46. See infra note 49.
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
48. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
49. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see
also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948) ("[Tlhere must be compelling
reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant. A search without a warrant demands
exceptional circumstances."); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) ("There
are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement
against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may
be dispensed with."). Attempting to limit warrantless intrusions through the judicial prefer-
ence for a warrant is consonant with the intent of the framers of the amendment. See supra
note 15. Although not faced with the plethora of warrantless searches found in modem
America, the framers were highly suspicious of official incursions into individual privacy fall-
ing outside the realm of judicial review. For a recent discussion of the historical background
and circumstances which led to the fourth amendment, see, Grano, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 603, 617-20 (1982).
50. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("Mhe burden is on those seeking
exemption to show the need for it .... "); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948) ("We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a
search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional man-
date that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.").
51. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393 (1978) (warrantless search of homicide scene at a home unconstitutional absent
exigent circumstances); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (exigencies
justifying search incident to arrest and automobile exception inapplicable to search of im-
pounded car at police station).
52. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1962).
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emergency" to justify a warrantless intrusion.13 When facing an ex-
igency such as danger or the risk of losing evidence, a police officer
need not postpone a search to obtain a warrant.5 4 The scope of a
warrantless intrusion should be limited to the satisfaction of that
societal need which justified the police officer's failure to secure a
warrant." Authority to engage in fourth amendment intrusions
without prior judicial approval should extend only to the time and
area relevant to the exigency56 and should terminate the instant that
the emergency is neutralized. 7 When the exigency no longer exists,
standard constitutional procedures, including the full protection of
the warrant requirement, should fully govern the situation,"5 even if
53. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948):
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emer-
gency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and
the police . . . . It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to
invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.
54. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969):
[I]t is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964):
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to
seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an
escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-
things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's
person or under his immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a
search is remote in time or place from the arrest.
55. See Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1388 n.292 (1977) (faced with conflicting lines of authority,
the Warren Court viewed warrant authorization as ordinarily necessary prior to search).
56. This was the policy behind the development of the "control test" in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). That test allowed an officer to search the area within the control
of the arrestee without either a warrant or probable cause to protect the officer against an
undetected weapon or the destruction of evidence. Id. at 762-63. This test was based on the
principle that the intrusion should be limited to the emergency which originally justified the
intrusion. But see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981) (permitting search of pas-
senger compartment of vehicle and all containers found within that compartment as incident
to "custodial arrest" of recent occupant of vehicle even where such person posed no threat to
either officer or evidence). The Belton majority's "bright-line" rule was inappropriate be-
cause the propriety of a search should be determined on an individual basis. See generally
LaFave, Case-by-Case Adjudication Versus "Standardized Procedures" The Robinson Di-
lemma, 1974 S. Cr. REV. 127, 141 (1974) (sophisticated rules attractive to lawyers are impos-
sible for officer in the field to apply).
57. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (government officials may enter
building to fight fire and determine its cause, but additional entries are authorized only pursu-
ant to warrant process).
58. The permissibility of an intrusion is a judgment call. In holding that police may not
use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon unless the officer is threatened with like force, the
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a partial intrusion has already occurred. 9
The automobile exception originated in 1925 in Carroll v.
United States.' Investigating officers there faced a situation which
required immediate action or the likely permanent loss of contra-
band. From this humble origin sixty years ago, the automobile ex-
ception has grown into a general exclusion from the warrant
requirement.
The occupants of the automobile in Carroll were not, nor could
they have been, arrested.6 Government liquor agents were con-
fronted with three choices: to let the automobile continue on its
way while the agents applied for a search warrant; to seize and im-
mobilize the automobile and strand its occupants, while applying
for a search warrant; or to conduct an immediate warrantless search
of the vehicle on the highway. As the harbinger of the practice
which would develop, the government agents conducted an immedi-
ate search and then turned to the courts to sanction their action.6"
The crucial difference between Carroll and the modem cases is that
in Carroll the government could demonstrate necessity for bypass-
ing the warrant process, and distinctions between intrusions were,
as of then, undeveloped. 3 The Supreme Court in Carroll had little
difficulty upholding the agents' conduct because it was consistent
with constitutional principles.
The "automobile exception" of Carroll turned on the existence
Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699 (1985) (citations omitted),
stated:
To determine the constitutionality of a seizure '[w]e must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.'... Be-
cause one of the factors is the extent of the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness
depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out.
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (A warrantless search must be "strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.").
59. But see United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984) (field test of package
by government agents does not require warrant when initial partial intrusion was made by
private party).
60. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
61. The federal agents did have probable cause, but because the crime was a misde-
meanor not committed in their presence, the agents could not arrest the defendants. Id. at
137. The current view is that an officer needs only probable cause to believe that the offense is
being committed in his presence. See 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 14, § 5.1(c) at
237.
62. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136.
63. 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 14, § 7.2(a)(2) at 510-11 (agents had no occas-
sion to obtain warrant because they were not looking for defendants at time they appeared).
The effect of seizure of the vehicle to strand the unarrested defendants was not considered by
the Court.
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of exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of the ve-
hicle. The Supreme Court held that the warrantless search was
valid because the automobile's mobility, coupled with the agents'
probable cause to believe that contraband was secreted within the
car, constituted the exigency and created a legitimate societal inter-
est to search without a warrant rather than risk permanent loss of
the evidence.' That exigency requirement, however, became lost in
the shuffle between Carroll and the later automobile exception
cases.
B. Growth Years
In the decades following the Carroll decision, there was little
development of the automobile exception. Few instances required
reliance upon the exception, consequently there was little pressure
to expand. Carroll arose from anomalous facts, unlikely to be re-
peated. 5 In most cases decided prior to 1970, automobile searches
were conducted incident to the arrest of the driver.66 Where courts
did rely upon the automobile exception, it was generally in tandem
with that older and more established search warrant exemption.67
Following an arrest, searches without independent probable cause
were allowed so as to assure the safety of the arresting officer and to
prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence.68 The extent of judi-
cial reliance upon the automobile exception was unclear 6 9 because
searches incident to arrest, at that time, extended to the entire
64. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-56 (1925).
65. Id. at 137.
66. Prior to Chimel v. California, 395 U:S. 752, 768 (1969) (area subject to warrantless
search incident to arrest is limited to area within immediate control of arrestee at time of
search), there was little need for an automobile exception. Since most searches of
automobiles followed arrests, the scope of a search incident to arrest extended to the entire
premises where the arrest occurred. Courts assumed that a search incident to an arrest would
extend to the entire automobile, since it extended to an entire house when it was the site of an
arrest. United States v. Harris, 331 U.S. 145, 146 (1947).
67. See generally Grano, supra note 49, at 616-21 (1982). Professor Grano traces the
origin of the search incident to arrest exception to colonial America. In light of the frequency
with which warrantless searches incident to arrest were validated, it was hardly surprising for
the Court to "tack on" the automobile exception to this pre-existing, accepted authority to
conduct warrantless searches.
68. See J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 236-37 (1982) (discussing purpose of search
incident to arrest).
69. See, eg., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). Defendant was charged with
transporting liquor without the requisite revenue stamps in violation of the Liquor Taxing
Act. Acting on confidential information, federal officers observed the transfer of liquor to
defendant's automobile. The officers followed the car to the defendant's garage, approached
the defendant, and informed him of their belief that the car contained bootleg liquor. The
defendant admitted that the car did contain whiskey, but that it was Canadian. The officers
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premises in which an arrest took place.7" If an entire house could
be subject to a search incident to arrest,7 1 then certainly an entire
automobile, when the scene of an arrest, was subject to search.72
The automobile exception began to expand only after the
Supreme Court reassessed the search incident to arrest doctrine. In
Chimel v. California,73 the Court limited the scope of such searches
to the extent necessary to accomplish those legitimate societal needs
which justified the exemption from the warrant requirement. Since
warrantless searches incident to arrest are intended to deny the ar-
restee access to evidence, which he might seek to destroy, and ac-
cess to weapons, the scope of the search need extend only to those
areas within the reaching and grabbing distance of an arrestee at the
time of the search.74 Since an entire house was no longer subject to
a warrantless search incident to arrest, similarly an automobile
could not be subject to an incidental search once the driver and
passengers were removed from the vehicle. Not all courts applied
opened the trunk without a warrant and found liquor in unstamped bottles. Defendant was
arrested, and both the car and the liquor were seized. Id. at 253-54.
The Court found the search to be valid, basing part of its decision on the automobile
exception. "Considering the doctrine of Carroll v. United States ... and the application of
this to the facts then disclosed, it seems plain enough that just before [the Defendant] entered
the garage the following officers properly could have stopped petitioner's car, made search
and put him under arrest." Id at 254-55 (citations omitted). The Court also based its hold-
ing on search incident to arrest. "Examination of the automobile accompanied an arrest,
without objection and upon admission of probable guilt." Id at 255. This brief, ambiguous
case illustrates the lack of clarity with which the Court dealt with warrantless searches of cars
prior to ChimeL
70. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1950) (search of an office incident
to arrest upheld).
71. United States v. Harris, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). But see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 768 (1969) (limiting area of search incident to arrest).
72. See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 255 (1938) (search of auto incident to
arrest upheld in combination with auto exception); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
(1927) (upheld search of motorboat incident to arrest); Haverstick v. Indiana, 196 Ind. 145,
148-49, 147 N.E. 625, 626-27 (1925) (officers' search of defendant's car incident to arrest for
speeding and search of packages, bundles, and bags carried by the arrested person held
proper); Howell v. State, 18 Md. App. 429, 431-32, 306 A.2d 554, 557 (1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 271 Md. 378, 386, 318 A.2d 189, 193 (1974) (held that there could be a valid
"search incident" inside an automobile even though a search of the auto would not be permit-
ted under the Carroll doctrine); Peterson v. State, 15 Md. App. 478, 489-93, 292 A.2d 714,
721-23 (1972) (search upheld under search incident to arrest and auto exception theories).
For a discussion of search analysis involving autos under the search incident to arrest and
auto exception theories, see Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is
Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. Rav. 987, 1012-22 (1976).
73. 395 U.S. 752, 765-68 (1969) (warrantless search of entire house, incident to arrest,
held illegal).
74. Id. at 763.
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Chimel's reasoning to automobiles, 75 but its logic remained compel-
ling. Two decades later, however, the Supreme Court repudiated
that reasoning when it expanded the scope of a search incident to
the arrest of a recent occupant of an automobile to the interior com-
partment of the vehicle even though the occupants were no longer
within reaching or grabbing distance.76 By then, however, the auto-
mobile exception had been redeveloped. It had outstripped the lim-
itations applicable to all other exceptions.
One year after the Chimel decision conformed searches incident
to arrest with constitutional doctrine by defining the purpose and
scope of exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court
allowed the automobile exception to strip its constitutional bounds.
In Carroll, the Court did not have to recognize an independent au-
tomobile exception. Since the search in Carroll was grounded on
exigent circumstances,77 the Court could have set it forth as an ex-
ample of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant re-
quirement.78 It was, nonetheless, a carefully defined and limited
exception based on a necessity arising from real exigencies and,
therefore, consistent with traditional fourth amendment analysis.
That was not so of Chambers v. Maroney7 9 where the Court up-
held a delayed warrantless search of a vehicle immobilized when its
75. The New York courts, prior to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), shared
this reluctance to apply the Chimel standard to cars. See, eg., People v. MacDonald, 61
A.D.2d 1081, 1082, 403 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (1978) (upholding under four distinct theories
(plain view, search incident to arrest, inventory search and inevitable discovery) an automo-
bile search by officer driving defendant's car to station while defendant was transported in
police car); People v. Abramowitz, 58 A.D.2d 921, 922, 396 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1976) (up-
holding as incident to arrest two searches of leather bag found behind driver's seat; noting
existence of independent probable cause where contraband discovered on arrestee's person
upon search outside of his automobile); People v. Goldstein, 60 Misc. 2d 745, 749, 304
N.Y.S.2d 106, 111 (1969) (upholding as search incident to arrest the search of a glove com-
partment when an officer was driving the car to the police station, even though the arrestee
was in a different car and in the custody of another officer). But see People v. Lewis, 26
N.Y.2d 547, 551-52, 260 N.E.2d 538, 540, 311 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (1970) (search of automo-
bile held not incident to arrest when defendant was on second floor of police station while car
was searched).
76. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (scope of a search incident to arrest
expanded to entire interior compartment of a vehicle and all containers found therein). Ironi-
cally, the Belton Court's rejection of the Chimel control principles in the context of the arrest
of an occupant of an automobile repudiated the New York Court of Appeals' belated accept-
ance of the Chimel doctrine in the automobile context. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 450,
407 N.E.2d 420, 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
77. The driver of the vehicle was not in custody and could have driven the car away
while a warrant was sought. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-36 (1925).
78. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (no exceptional circum-
stances where arresting officers had ample time to obtain warrant prior to search and arrest).
79. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
[Vol. 36:375
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
occupants were arrested. Once the arrestees were removed from the
vehicle, the exigent circumstances recognized in Carroll ended. Po-
lice officers were not confronted with the possibility of the loss of
the evidence nor any other "grave emergency."8 Justice White
wrote that because "the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car
is readily movable,"81 the automobile may be searched "immedi-
ately without a warrant or the car itself seized and held without a
warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant."82
Lumping the fact situations in Carroll and Chambers together
served Justice White's purpose, but he misrepresented ,the facts in
Chambers. The automobile in Carroll was readily movable and its
occupants could not be arrested or detained. In Chambers the of-
ficers had ample opportunity to detain the automobile because the
occupants were already in custody. The police were in a position to
ensure that the vehicle was not moved, even though it was inher-
ently mobile. The seizure of the automobile did not inconvenience
or strand any of the already arrested occupants.
Justice White stated that the probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contained evidence sufficed to justify its seizure. He con-
cluded that since an immediate search was no more intrusive than a
seizure until a warrant is obtained, the search was justified.83 This
conclusion is remarkable for the number of errors it compounds.
First, the Court has held in other contexts that a warrantless seizure
is a less intrusive, preferred alternative to a warrantless search.84
80. Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). Police unsuccessfully at-
tempted to justify a warrantless search of the suspect's home under the exigent circumstances
exception, even though the suspect had been under surveillance for two months. The Court
stated:
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate
between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to
make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective
mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.
Id. at 455.
81. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 52.
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the immobili-
zation of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably,
only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the
"greater." But which is the "greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion is itself a
debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and
holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 51-52.
84. Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3387 (1984) (securing arrestee's apartment
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Second, at the time of the search the automobile had already been
seized. Clearly a seizure and a search is more intrusive than a
seizure alone. Third, in comparing the intrusions the Court seems
to assume that seizure "until a warrant is served" will always result
in issuance of a warrant. But the warrant process protects because
warrants are not to be issued every time the police request them.
Police officers often make mistakes in determining the existence of
probable cause as well as in the scope of the intrusion so that a
neutral magistrate will not always issue a warrant.85 Finally,
searches and seizures should not be so simply analogized because
each interferes with a fundamentally different interest.86 A search
interferes with a privacy interest, while a seizure interferes with
only a possessory interest.87
After concluding that an immediate search is no worse than a
seizure, the Court proceeded to make a second leap over fourth
amendment principles. It stated that the delayed search of the vehi-
cle at the police station was justified on the grounds that there were
exigent circumstances at the scene of the arrest which made an im-
mediate search unsafe and impractical.88 This conclusion turns the
relationship between privacy rights and exigent circumstances on its
overnight pending issuance of a search warrant: "Recognizing the generally less intrusive
nature of a seizure, the Court has frequently approved warrantless seizures of property, on
the basis of probable cause, for the time necessary to secure a warrant .. ") (citations
omitted); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (temporary seizure of luggage
suspected of containing narcotics at airport based on "sniff test" by police dog: "[T]he man-
ner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intru-
sive than a typical search."); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 n.8 (1977) ("A search
of the interior was therefore a far greater intrusion into Fourth Amendment values than the
impoundment of the footlocker."); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970)
(involving the temporary seizure of packages containing gold coins illegally imported into the
United States: "The only thing done here on the basis of suspicion was detention of the
packages. There was at that point no possible invasion of the right 'to be secure' in the
'persons, houses, papers, and effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment against 'unreason-
able searches and seizures'.").
85. "[The warrant requirement] is, or should be, an important working part of our ma-
chinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the 'well intentioned but
mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (citation omitted).
86. See Grano, supra note 49, at 648 (search and seizure interferes with various constitu-
tional rights).
87. Of course, if one's privacy interest in the contents of a car is reduced, then the
severity of the intrusion of a search is reduced to the same degree.
88. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52 n.10:
It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house. All occu-
pants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A
careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers,
and it would serve the owner's convenience and the safety of his car to have the
vehicle and the keys together at the station house.
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head. Under standard fourth amendment jurisprudence, exigent
circumstances temporarily overwhelm continuously present privacy
rights.8 9 Chambers treats the exigency as extinguishing the underly-
ing privacy rights which remain suppressed well after the circum-
stances which originally justified the warrantless search have
terminated. This is a deeply troublesome reversal.
Under the traditional analysis a person is entitled to the protec-
tion of an impartial judicial officer interposed between himself and
the police. An exception arises only during the span of state-
demonstrated and well-defined, compelling emergencies. The
Chambers approach defines such emergencies as beginning when
the police may conduct warrantless searches, but never defines its
end point. The facts of Chambers suggest two limitations on this
expansion of police power: first, that exigent circumstances beyond
mere mobility are required to justify delaying a warrantless search;
and second, that the search must not be delayed beyond a reason-
able time. Both limitations were subsequently abandoned. Despite
Justice White's assurance that the prior cases did not "require or
suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto
even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection
for privacy that a warrant affords,"9 the decision in Chambers
started fourth amendment jurisprudence on that very journey. The
decision effectively eliminated the exigent circumstance of actual
mobility as the justification for avoidance of the warrant
requirement.
In its place, the Court substituted a fiction of inherent mobility.
A functioning automobile is always movable, but in Chambers and
subsequent cases, the vehicle was under complete police control.
The Court recognized the sham of inherent mobility when a major-
ity of the Court conceded that "warrantless searches of vehicles by
state officers have been sustained in cases in which the possibilities
of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in it destroyed were re-
mote, if not non-existent."9 The Court nevertheless continues to
rely upon inherent mobility to justify its consistent differentiation of
automobiles from other personal property, 92 especially when at-
89. See infra notes 103-13 and accompanying text (traditional fourth amendment
jurisprudence).
90. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50.
91. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
92. Notwithstanding the lack of importance that mobility plays in determining the scope
of the automobile exception, the Court has continued to at least pay lip service to a vehicle's
mobility as one justification for the exception. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425
(1981) (reviewing cases in which the Court claimed inherent mobility of vehicle made secur-
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tempting to justify additional expansion of the automobile
exception.
93
The undefined termination point of exigent circumstances was
still uncertain a few years later when the Court decided Texas v.
White,94 where no reason was offered to justify the delayed search
without a warrant.9 Today, even exclusive legal control of a pack-
age by the owner does not necessarily reassert extinguished privacy
interests. In Illinois v. Andreas96 the Court broadly held that once
police have lawfully examined the contents of a container the owner
has no privacy interest in its contents until there is "a substantial
likelihood that the contents have been changed."97 Chambers and
Andreas read together could imply that once the police have a legal
basis for the search of an automobile or container, they can search
at any later time until there is a "substantial likelihood" that the
owner has changed its contents. 98
Another portion of the exigency theory for warrantless searches
was replaced following Chambers with an evolving notion that the
privacy interest in an automobile does not rise to the same level as
ing warrant impracticable and created exigency to justify automobile exception); Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (citing cases in which an automobile's mobility distin-
guished it from other private property for which search warrant was required).
93. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court significantly expanded the
scope of warrantless searches of automobiles and containers found in automobiles upon the
premise that mobility justified foregoing the warrant requirement. "Given the nature of an
automobile in transit, the [Carroll] Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary
if police officers are to secure the illicit substance." Id. at 806-07. "The rationale justifying a
warrantless search of an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably
applies with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit
substance." Id. at 809.
94. 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam).
95. Id. at 67-69. Justice Marshall stated in dissent:
[O]nly by misstating the holding of Chambers v. Maroney, .. can the Court make
that case appear dispositive of this one. The Court in its brief per curiam opinion
today extends Chambers to a clearly distinguishable factual setting. . . . Since
. . . there was no apparent justification for the warrantless removal of respondent's
car, it is clear that this is a different case from Chambers.
Id at 69-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This sentiment was voiced by the Texas Supreme
Court in White v. Texas, 521 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 67 (1975):
[The search of appellant's car cannot be sustained under the automobile exception,
for there is no showing in the evidence of any reasonable likelihood that the auto-
mobile would be moved. . . In the absence of the "exigent circumstances" which
are necessary to justify a warrantless search, we find no justification for a search
without a warrant.
96. 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
97. Id. at 773.
98. E.g., Gamble v. State, 480 So.2d 38 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), mem. cert. denied
(1985) (reading Chambers and Andreas together held police need not obtain warrant to
search an immobilized automobile).
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that interest in a home or office. The diminished expectation of pri-
vacy theory was applied for the first time in Cardwell v. Lewis,99
dealing with the warrantless examination of the exterior of a mur-
der suspect's vehicle. The Supreme Court premised the diminished
expectation of privacy in a vehicle upon its function as transporta-
tion, that it seldom serves as a residence or repository of personal
effects, and that a car has little capacity for escaping public scru-
tiny."°° Ultimately, the Court found support for this argument in
the regulation to which an automobile is subject as compared to a
home.10 1 Of course, as the Cardwell Court pointed out, that search
was limited to the exterior of the vehicle and "nothing from the
interior of the car and no personal effects, which the fourth amend-
ment traditionally has been deemed to protect, were searched or
seized and introduced in evidence."10 2 The theory of a diminished
expectation of privacy was later used to justify the warrantless
search of the interior of automobiles, even though every rationale
offered in Cardwell failed when applied to the interior of a vehicle
and to its separate storage compartments.10 3  Nevertheless, the
Court relied upon the diminished expectation of privacy rationale to
further expand the automobile exception.
The Supreme Court searched for a decade for a plausible argu-
ment in support of exempting automobile searches from the warrant
requirement. In United States v. Ross,"° the Supreme Court de-
99. 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974) (police had probable cause that suspect's automobile
was involved in an alleged murder and obtained paint scrapings from exterior of the vehicle
without his permission or a warrant; held that this "search" infringed upon no expectation of
privacy).
100. Id. at 590.
101. ERg., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (extensive regulation leads to
far greater police citizen contact on the road than in the home). But see Katz, Automobile
Searches and Diminished Expectations In The Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557,
571 n.79 (1982) (disputing Court's claim that the automobile's primary function is transpor-
tation by reference to printed and sung examples of the expanded role of the automobile in
American society). Compare, CLEVELAND, OHIO ORDINANCES ch. 369 (1981) (detailed re-
quirements for residences, such as dimensions, window area, ventilation, sanitation, water
supply, garbage disposal, heating, electricity, maintenance, pest control, maintences of curti-
lage, access and egress), with CLEVELAND, OHIO ORDINANCES ch. 437 (1981) (requiring
lights, reflectors, brakes, adequate muffler and an unobstructed windshield for an
automobile).
102. Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 591.
103. Items secured out of sight in separate compartments are not subject to view, are in
appropriate places for storing personal items, and are not subject to any special regulation.
Id.
104. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In this case, an informant told the police that the defendant
was dealing heroin from his automobile. Id. at 800. Police officers stopped the defendant in
his vehicle, searched it and discovered narcotics in a closed paper bag found in the trunk. Id.
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dlared that the exemption always rested upon the "impracticability
of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of con-
traband goods," grounded in a vehicle's inherent mobility. 10 5 The
Court purported to return to the original rationale behind the auto-
mobile exception advanced by Carroll, but that reasoning could not
support an automobile exception broad enough to cover the facts of
Ross, nor did the Court discard expansions of the automobile excep-
tion achieved under now discredited and discarded rationales. 10 6
The Ross situation compelled the Court to abandon the dimin-
ished privacy rationale because its application to the search of two
containers placed in the locked trunk of the automobile would have
been laughable.107 As the containers themselves were fully capable
of supporting privacy interests, the Court simply dropped the di-
minished expectation of privacy rationale. Failing to find any genu-
ine rationale for its "impracticability" justification, the majority
attempted to justify the exception simply by its age, purporting to
trace it back to the first Congress.'08 Justice Stevens' efforts to fash-
at 801. Another warrantless search was taken after the automobile was impounded, yielding
cash in a zippered leather pouch. Id.
105. Id. at 806. Relying on Carroll, Justice Stevens, the author of the opinion, reviewed
the Carroll Court's historical analysis of legislation enacted by the first Congress, distinguish-
ing searches of houses from those of wagons or carriages.
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment we find in
the first Congress, and in the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference
made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture,
when concealed in a dwelling house. . . and like goods in course of transportation
• . . and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach
of a search warrant.
Id at 805-06 (1982) (quoting United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
106. The exception recognized in Carroll was based on the actual mobility of the vehicle
searched on an open highway, where the suspect was not under arrest. In Ross, the Court
claimed to return to mobility as a rationale, but the arrested suspect was never in any position
to deny the police officer control of his vehicle.
107. Indeed, the Court implicitly acknowledged the rationale of earlier decisions that
found that diminished expectations of privacy in luggage could not be legitimately connected
to the location from which the luggage was seized. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
764-65 (1979), the Court had stated, in reliance on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), that
a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not necessarily at-
tended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken
from other locations. One is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions
in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather
than transported by other means. . . . We therefore find no justification for the
extension of Carroll and its progency to the warrantless search of one's personal
luggage merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by police.
See also 453 U.S. at 424-25 ("The automobile exception. . . is. . . supported by the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile. . . . No such diminished ex-
pectation of privacy characterizes luggage.").
108. Ross, 456 U.S. at 811.
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ion a horse-and-buggy exception to the warrant requirement
demonstrated the Court's willingness to advance any argument in
support of warrantless searches of automobiles in its effort to bypass
standard constitutional procedures.10 9 Thus, sixty years after it was
born, but only a few years after it started to grow, the automobile
exception abandoned the exigency of actual mobility for inherent
mobility and general impracticability, and spawned and then termi-
nated the rationale of a diminished expectation of privacy in
automobiles.
C. Application of the Exception to Containers
Courts have had more difficulty applying the warrant exception
to containers' 10 found in automobiles than determining whether a
warrant is needed to search the vehicle itself. It was not always so
difficult. When the warrant requirement was only excused for im-
mediate safety concerns or for the preservation of evidence, the
standards governing such searches were discernable and easy to ap-
ply. As the warrant preference fades to mere memory, the tests
have become more difficult to apply to new fact situations. They
have been replaced by shifting tests which this pliant Court seem-
ingly alters with each situation presented by a prosecutor. Ironi-
cally, simultaneous with this development has been the Supreme
Court's announced policy of offering bright-line rules11 ' on fourth
109. Ultimately, it must be realized that Ross, like all of the decisions upholding warrant-
less searches of automobiles since United States v. Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), deviated
from the constitutional norm because there was no need to avoid obtaining a warrant since
the police had already seized the two containers.
110. The term "containers," as used hereinafter, means a self-enclosed package in practi-
cally any shape or form; from those with seemingly high expectations of privacy, like luggage,
purses and wallets; to those with lower expectations, such as boxes, bags and bales; to the odd
and bizarre, like balloons, not typically associated with carrying goods.
111. "Bright-line rules" are those rules which are capable of mechanical application. In
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1980), the Court formulated the bright-line rule that
incident to the lawful arrest of a car's recent occupant, the entire passenger compartment
could be searched. Id. at 460. The Court stated: "In short, '[a] single familiar standard is
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they con-
front.'" Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)). The
Court also quoted Professor LaFave:
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule, is
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus
ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the con-
text of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of
heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they
may be 'literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.'
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amendment issues in order to clarify and provide adequate guidance
for police.
1 1 2
In the case of containers seized from automobiles, the problem
has been compounded because more than one exception to the war-
rant requirement might apply, and the results obtained under the
standards for each exception might not be the same. Moreover, the
Court's attempt to give bright-line guidance to the automobile ex-
ception has increased the confusion by casting doubt upon the con-
tinued vitality and validity of related doctrines governing other
exceptions. The Court has eliminated the necessity principle as a
governing standard, leaving confusion where once there was reason.
This confusion is well-illustrated by examining the rationales uti-
lized to allow warrantless searches of containers found in
automobiles.
1. Search Incident to Arrest
Initially, searches incident to arrest were restricted by a control
test, limiting both the area into which a search could legitimately
take place and the time after which the search could no longer oc-
cur. Soon after promulgating this test, however, the Court repudi-
ated its reasoning; limiting the items to which it applied while
continuously contracting the formerly explicit time and area limita-
tions. The decisions regarding container searches justified as inci-
dent to arrest appear muddled. As compared to similar searches
justified under the automobile exception, the lines of decisions are
not resolved.
Chimel v. California 113 provided a brilliant test that accommo-
dated both fourth amendment principles and law enforcement needs
without compromising either. Under the easily applied Chimel
standards, a warrantless search was reasonable when made incident
to arrest and until the arrestee could no longer threaten the arrest-
ing officer nor tamper with evidence. Thus, an arrestee's person and
the area into which he might reach or grab for a weapon or evidence
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, supra note 56, at 141 (quota-
tions omitted)).
112. As the title of Professor LaFave's article would suggest, the choices are not at all
clear-cut. LaFave comments on the drawbacks of bright-line rules, by writing that such rules
"fail to recognize 'that the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional require-
ments, are practical and not abstract.' " LaFave, supra note 56, at 163 (quoting United States
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825
(1982) (It is important for. . . law enforcement officials . . . that the applicable rules be
clearly established) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
113. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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may be searched without a warrant or independent probable cause
to believe that a weapon or evidence of the crime would be found.114
Once the officer safely exercises dominion over the arrestee and
reduces the immediately surrounding area to his control, it is no
longer reasonable to search without a warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate.115 The Chimel test harmonized privacy and safety con-
cerns and, at the same time, governed both the initial intrusion and
the scope of that intrusion. Once the safety and preservation neces-
sity for the initial intrusion has passed, the search may proceed no
further in respect for privacy interests.1 16 Courts, however, have
been reluctant to limit the scope of searches under the test, bending
over backwards to include as incidental to arrest searches of con-
tainers seized from arrestees where there clearly was no continuing
necessity to justify the failure to obtain a warrant.1 17 Moreover, the
114. Id. at 763.
115. This is consistent with the constitutional standard which provides that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations
omitted). Furthermore, "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable,
it must be used." California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2074 (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)).
116. This is consistent with the standard first announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), that in a case involving the warrantless "stop and frisk" investigation of a robbery
suspect, a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
its initiation." Iad at 25-26.
As applied in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court stated:
We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Nu-
merous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does
not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they rea-
sonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. . . . [A] four-day
search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be
rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93. See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978)
(entry by firefighters in response to a fire, followed by a subsequent second search producing
evidence of arson): "[O]nce the fire has been extinguished and the firemen have left the prem-
ises, the emergency is over. Further intrusion . . . should be accompanied by a warrant
indicating the authority under which the firemen presume to enter and search." Tyler, 436
U.S. at 516 (White, J., concurring).
As one noted commentator has observed: "Any conduct within [the premises] by the
officer which is in any way inconsistent with the purported reason for the entry is a just cause
for healthy skepticism by the courts. . . . [I]t is essential that courts be alert to the possibil-
ity of subterfuge." 2 SEARCH AND SEIZUIRE, supra note 14, § 6.6 at 473. Accord Mascolo,
The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 419, 428 (1973) (courts must be vigilant to any attempt to cir-
cumvent the requirement of a warrant).
117. Part of this reluctance may simply be inability to apply the rule, as suggested by
Justice Stewart in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1981) (citation omitted):
Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest may
be stated clearly enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to apply in
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Supreme Court's guidance on this subject has not been consistent or
clear.'
18
The Court seemed clear as late as 1977 when, in United States v.
Chadwick,119 a delayed warrantless search of a footlocker was not
allowed. Federal officers conducted a sniff-test of a footlocker re-
cently transported cross-country by rail. The test indicated that the
footlocker contained a controlled substance. The agents arrested
the suspects and seized the footlocker just as it was placed in the
trunk of an automobile. Ninety minutes later, with the suspects
under arrest, the agents opened and examined the footlocker at the
federal building. 120 Chief Justice Burger stressed that from the mo-
ment the footlocker was seized, it was totally within the control of
the arresting officers. There was neither the risk that the contents
of the footlocker would be removed by the arrestees nor reason to
believe that the footlocker contained explosives or other inherently
specific cases. . .. When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled
principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his
constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his author-
ity.... [C]ourts have found no workable definition of the area within the immedi-
ate control of the arrestee.
Another reason for the reluctance to apply the Chimel standard stemmed from hostility
to the principle and outright rejection of the rule, resulting in extreme distortions of the test.
See, eg., Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S.
976 (1978) ("the authority to conduct a search incident to an arrest, once established, still
exists even after the need to disarm and prevent destruction of evidence have [sic] been dis-
pelled.").
The result of such distortion was that defendants as a class were treated as supermen
capable of defying basic physical limitations so that courts could reach the conclusion that a
defendant might still have exercised control in a given situation. See, eg., Collins v. Com-
monwealth, 574 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1978) (upholding warrantless search of a compartment
inside an air conditioner four to seven feet away from the arrestee despite presence of three
officers), compare with id. at 209 ("[u]nless [defendant] was an acrobat, a Houdini or
Stretcho-Man I cannot conceive how the [air conditioning] panel could have fallen within the
area of his immediate control) (Lukowsky, J., dissenting); Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 464
A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984) (though female defendant was hand-
cuffed, proper to search drawer of nightstand); State v. Means, 177 Mont. 193, 581 P.2d 406
(1978), rev'd on other grounds, 187 Mont. 398, 610 P.2d 140 (1980) (after arrest, police search
of area under bathtub and between mattresses upheld under theory that search incident to
arrest may extend to all areas likely to contain instrumentalities of crime); State v. Cherry,
298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980) (search under rug
producing gun upheld although defendant was handcuffed and seated in a chair in custody of
several officers).
118. Compare Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (holding the scope of a
search incident to arrest must be strictly limited to the area a suspect might actually reach to
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence) with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981)
(upholding a warrantless search incident to arrest of a jacket within a vehicle's passenger
compartment although the arrestees no longer had access to compartment).
119. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
120. Id. at 3-4.
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dangerous items. 121 It was not difficult to secure and store the foot-
locker at the federal building. As the Chief Justice concluded, there
was no exigency justifying an immediate search without a
warrant.
122
The Court's opinion in Chadwick should not be read as limited
to simply barring the delayed warrantless search of the footlocker.
Although the majority opinion is not crystal clear on this point, its
reasoning appears to bar the warrantless search of the footlocker
once it was seized and under the control of the officers at the scene
of the arrest, just as it barred the delayed search ninety minutes
later at the federal building. The Chief Justice applied the Chimel
test and wrote:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other
personal property not immediately associated with the person of
the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is
no longer an incident of the arrest.123
The Chadwick ruling provided bright-line guidance similar to
Chimel, without labeling it as such. Chadwick's bright-line rule is
consistent with fourth amendment principles; as soon as the emer-
gency passes and police exercise control over the receptacle, it is
unreasonable for officers to proceed further without a warrant. 124
Consequently, in Chadwick, the Court stated that the proper proce-
dure would have been to store the footlocker until a warrant is-
sued.25 Nothing indicated a differing result had the footlocker
121. Id at 4.
122. Id at 11.
123. Id at 15. Whether the agents could have conducted a search incident to arrest of
the suspect's footlocker was a subject of disagreement between Justice Brennan, concurring,
and Justice Blackmun, dissenting. Said Brennan: "[I]t is not obvious to me that the contents
of the heavy, securely locked footlocker were within the area of their 'immediate control' for
purposes of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine." Id at 17 n.2. Blackmun countered:
"[The footlocker] certainly. . . would have been properly subject to search at the time [of
arrest]. . . ." Id at 23 (footnote omitted).
124. Chadwick is not an automobile exception case. The government never contended
that the foot locker's momentary presence in the automobile made the search valid. Indeed,
had the government even attempted to so argue the applicability of the automobile exception,
the same facts that precluded the successful assertion of the search as incident to arrest would
have precluded its assertion. First, mobility was diffused by the seizure of the trunk by the
police. Second, there was no diminished expectation of privacy in storing personal items in
luggage.
125. Once the federal agents had seized it at the railroad station and had safely
transferred it to the Boston Federal Building under their exclusive control, there
was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been
removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained.
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been stored in the vehicle. The Court's reasoning applies as
strongly to the search of a container under the automobile excep-
tion as it did to the search incident to arrest theory. Although the
Chadwick Court did not challenge the Carroll version of the auto-
mobile exception itself, it limited the exception by excluding those
contents of an automobile in sealed and independently movable
containers.
By recognizing that luggage is primarily used to hold "personal
effects" (which are intended objects of fourth amendment protec-
tion),126 the Court reconfirmed the holding of Katz that the fourth
amendment protects people and their possessions when an owner
manifests a legitimate expectation of privacy, even while in pub-
liC.1 27 There was no diminished expectation of privacy in the lug-
gage placed in the automobile; the government did not show an
exigency to justify the search.
The government in Chadwick did contend that the fourth
amendment was only intended to protect the "core subjects" of the
Constitution's prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures,
namely, home, office and private communications. 121 Chief Justice
Burger flatly rejected this attempt to fashion a general public-place
exception to the warrant requirement.
A consistent application of the Chimel standards to containers
did not occur, despite the compelling logic of Chadwick. In less
than a decade, the Supreme Court repudiated almost all of the
Chimel-Chadwick rationale. The first limitation of the Chimel con-
trol test was promulgated by the Supreme Court's emerging con-
servative majority in United States v. Robinson.129 There the Court
held a search of the person pursuant to a custodial arrest based
upon probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the fourth
amendment so that no additional justification or exigency is neces-
sary.1 30 The Court extended that holding further still in finding
that the Chimel control test need not be applied to the search of
items associated with the person.13 1 Application of the control test
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 (footnote omitted). "Facilities were readily available in which the
footlocker could have been stored securely .... " Id. at 4.
126. E.g., United States v. Rothman, 492 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1974) (search of
luggage held invalid on Chimel grounds).
127. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
128. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6-7.
129. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
130. Id. at 235.
131. Id. at 224. In that case, the police searched the suspect's breast pocket incident to
arrest, yielding a crumpled cigarette pack containing heroin. Id at 221-24. Under Chimel,
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to an arrestee's person would preclude the search of a closed
container once it is taken from the person and is in police control.
To avoid that result, the Court has found that searches of the arres-
tee's person, unlike searches of items within the arrestee's reach,
were not historically bound by notions of exigent circumstances.
Instead, the justification for the search of the person, and the intru-
sion into containers taken from the person, flowed directly from the
arrest. The search, therefore, need not be independently justified
nor limited by notions of control.
1 32
Another avenue of limiting the Chimel control test resulted in
an extension of the justification of a search incident to arrest to vir-
tually any time after the arrest so long as the arrestee remained in
police custody. First, the Court upheld a search of an arrestee's
clothes even though a substantial period of time had elapsed
betweed the arrest and the search. 33 Later, in Illinois v. Lafay-
ette,134 Chief Justice Burger upheld a search similar to that disal-
lowed in Chadwick, not incident to the arrest, but as an inventory
search, 135 proving the Court's ingenuity at providing alternative jus-
tifications for avoiding the warrant process.1 36
Indeed, Chimel and Chadwick appear so eroded that there is
serious doubt as to whether they continue to govern. The Supreme
Court, in New York v. Belton, 37 abandoned the control test formu-
lated in Chimel and enforced in Chadwick. There it upheld as inci-
dent to arrest the search of the entire interior passenger
once the package was removed from the arrestee's control, it could not be searched without a
warrant. The Court was forced to draw a distinction between the two prongs of the search
incident to arrest exception; search of the person was justified by traditional procedure. "The
validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from
its first enunciation .... " Id. at 224.
"'The right without a search warrant contempbraneously to search persons lawfully ar-
rested. . . is not to be doubted.'" IH at 225 (quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,
30 (1925)). See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (companion case to Robinson
holding same).
132. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973):
Throughout the series of cases in which the Court has addressed the second propo-
sition relating to search incident to a lawful arrest-the area beyond the person of
the arrestee which such a search may cover-no doubt has been expressed as to the
unqualified authority of the arresting authority to search the person of the arrestee.
133. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S 800, 806-08 (1974).
134. 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
135. Id. at 648 (inventory search of an arrestee's shoulder bag, yielding illegal amphet-
amines upheld as part of the routine booking procedure).
136. Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, reiterated that the de-
fendant's shoulderbag could not be searched incident to her arrest for disturbing the peace.
Id at 649 (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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compartment of a vehicle and all containers located therein, even
though the arrestees were disarmed and unable to reach or grab an
item in the vehicle.1 38 By allowing such a search, Belton measures
control from the time immediately prior to the arrest itself, to when
the driver still maintains dominion over the interior compartment
of the vehicle and its contents. 13 9 Belton also assumes that the
reach of control extends to the entire passenger compartment, even
if reaching or grabbing an item in a particular part of the compart-
ment would have been difficult or impossible to do while driving.14
Chimel, on the other hand, looked to necessity to justify the war-
rantless search, and therefore properly measured control by the ex-
isting facts at the moment of the search.
2. Under the Automobile Exception
A warrantless search of a container found in an automobile is
sanctioned today most easily and readily under the automobile ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. The exception appears to be
open-ended, and the Court appears amenable to any request for its
expansion. The existing doctrine leaves little question that in virtu-
ally every situation the police have the authority to substitute their
own judgment for a magistrate's when the object to be searched is
an automobile. A possible saving grace of the automobile exception
is its requirement of independent probable cause; the police must
believe that evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. 141 The
point of contention is that the justifications which theoretically sup-
port the automobile exception are totally inapplicable to the search
of containers found in an automobile. There is no emergency situa-
tion which would militate against securing a search warrant in
either situation. The reasons traditionally asserted to justify the
search of the vehicle, mobility and the reduced expectation of pri-
138. Id. at 456-57.
139. This is a less dramatic departure if you start with Chambers rather than Chimel,
because under Chambers exigencies are balanced against privacy interests only at the moment
that those interests are extinguished. This will generally occur when defendant still has pos-
session of the car. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
140. Cf supra note 117.
141. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982). "The scope of a warrantless search
based on probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search author-
ized by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of a magistrate is
waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize." Id The sole limitation
upon the scope of a warrantless search under Ross is that the area searched must be capable
of containing the object sought. Id. at 824. Therefore, for instance, a police officer would not
be justified in searching the vehicle's glove compartment for the professed purpose of de-
tecting illegal aliens which the vehicle was suspected of carrying.
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vacy stemming from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of
traveling on highways, are irrational when utilized to distinguish
containers seized in searched vehicles from containers seized in
other locales.142 There is absolutely no greater reason to conduct a
warrantless search of a container seized from an automobile than
there is a container seized from any location. 43 Consequently, in
the past five years, the Supreme Court has thoroughly reworked
and rethought the exception in order to expand the exception to
include containers.
The broad proposition suggested by Chadwick was adopted by a
slight majority in Arkansas v. Sanders,1" which held that the auto-
mobile exception does not extend to luggage found in the vehicle.45
Although probable cause focused on the luggage before it was
placed in the vehicle, the Court limited the exception to the vehicle
itself.146
First, the Court distinguished Chambers holding that probable
cause to believe that a container houses contraband justifies only the
warrantless seizure and securing of the container.147 A search must
await issuance of a warrant. Second, the Court held that the occu-
pant's diminished expectation of privacy while in a vehicle does not
extend to containers found in the automobile.' 48 Finally, the Court
142. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 (1979) (privacy associated with luggage
is same whether luggage is in automobile or elsewhere).
143. Eg., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in personal luggage worthy of fourth amendment protection); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 763, 766 (1979) (extended protected privacy interest to containers in automobiles);
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (closed opaque
containers manifest legitimate expectations of privacy). See generally Note, A Reconsidera-
tion of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154 (1977).
144. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
145. "We therefore find no justification for the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the
warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it was located in an automobile
lawfully stopped by the police." Id. at 765.
146. "A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in
which it rides. .... Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its
mobility is in no way affected by the place from which it was taken." Ia at 763 (footnotes
omitted).
147. "We are not persuaded by the State's argument that, under Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970), if the police were entitled to seize the suitcase, then they were entitled to
search it." Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.14. "We view. . . the seizure of a suitcase as quite
different from the seizure of an automobile." Id
It is beyond question that the police easily could have obtained a warrant to search
respondent's bag if they had taken the suitcase to a magistrate. They had probable
cause to believe not only that respondent was carrying marihuana, but also that the
contraband was contained in the suitcase they seized.
Id. at 764 n.12.
148. Id at 761.
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held that even though a container while in a vehicle may be as mo-
bile as thei'ehicle itself, "the exigency of mobility must be assessed
at the point immediately before the search-after the police have
seized the object to be searched and have it securely within their
control." '14 9 Sanders stressed that a warrantless search is unneces-
sary once the police have secured the container.1 50 Arguably, war-
rantless searches of automobiles are justified by the greater difficulty
in storing and safeguarding automobiles. This argument is rendered
foolish by examining the facts of the automobile exception cases.
Many involved delayed searches after the police had already re-
moved and safeguarded the vehicles.'
Sanders was robbed of clarity by Justice Powell's assertion that
only "worthy containers"' 52 found in a vehicle are protected. Jus-
tice Powell provided examples of containers whose outward appear-
ance divulge their contents,' 53 but confusion resulted from his
statement indicating the difficulty in determining which containers
taken from a vehicle could be searched without a warrant and
which were entitled to full protection under the fourth amendment.
That confusion was compounded in Robbins v. California i 4
when a majority of the Court could not agree which containers were
or were not entitled to the full protection of the warrant clause.
The state contended that marijuana contained in two opaque plastic
packages found during a warrantless search of the recessed luggage
compartment of the rear of a station wagon was subject to the di-
minished expectation of privacy because it was an obvious method
149. Id. at 763 (footnote omitted).
150. Id. at 756.
151. E.g., Florida v. Myers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1852 (1984); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 366 (1976); Texas v. white, 423 U.S. 67, 67 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 437 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 58 (1967).
152. Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search
will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers
(for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot sup-
port any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package
will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant. . . . There
will be difficulties in determining which parcels taken from an automobile require a
warrant for their search and which do not. Our decision in this case means only
that a warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched and
that the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other
parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an automobile.
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
153. Items within actual or practical plain view because of their telltale outward appear-
ance are not protected. Id.
154. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
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of packaging the contraband. 5 Although the proposition was re-
jected, a majority could not agree on the proper rationale. Justice
Stewart wrote for a plurality and reasoned that the automobile ex-
ception did not apply to closed, opaque containers.15 6 Justice Pow-
ell argued alone, again, for a worthy container rule157 which would
require a Katz expectation of privacy analysis of each container on a
case-by-case basis.158
Sanders and Robbins represented the last attempts to limit the
scope of the automobile exception. As long as the automobile ex-
ception rested upon the purported diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in a vehicle, a majority of the Court could not agree to an
open-ended exemption which extended to containers as well as the
vehicle itself. Even in an area not known for its reasoned opinions,
enough Justices found it impossible to distinguish on privacy
grounds between containers found in automobiles and those found
elsewhere. The change in Court personnel following Robbins 159 re-
sulted in another restatement of the basis for the automobile excep-
tion and the complete abandonment of the privacy rationale. In
United States v. Ross,16 a new majority substituted its more amor-
phous rationale, impracticability,161 removing the barrier of reason
which had prevented expansion of the exception to containers found
in the vehicle when the exception rested upon expectations of pri-
vacy. Similarly, the Court no longer looked to necessity to deter-
mine whether a warrantless search of containers found in a vehicle
was permissible. Justice Powell argued in Sanders that the state
had never demonstrated the necessity for a warrantless search of
155. Id at 274.
156. Id at 428.
157. Id at 432-33 (Powell, J., concurring). No other Justice ever subscribed to Justice
Powell's "worthy container" argument.
158. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without joining in any of the opin-
ions. Id at 429 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The lack of insight into Burger's position on this
issue made Robbins all the more dubious and United States v. Ross, 454 U.S. 798 (1982),
which followed, less surprising.
159. Justice Stewart, the author of the plurality opinion in Robbins, and one of the princi-
pal advocates of strict limitations upon exceptions to the warrant requirement, retired at the
end of the term, days after delivering his opinions in Robbins and New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981). On Friday, September 25, 1981, Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
was sworn in as Stewart's replacement.
160. 454 U.S. 798 (1982).
161. Id. at 820-21. See supra notes 102-09, 151-53 and accompanying text. The new
majority consisted of the dissenters in Robbins (Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens), Chief
Justice Burger (whose silent concurrence in Robbins may have been illustrative of his ambigu-
ous position on this issue), and Justices O'Connor and Powell (whose reluctant concurrence
in Robbins made his shift hardly surprising).
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luggage taken from an automobile. 62 The exception was automati-
cally extended to all containers when Ross held that a search sanc-
tioned under the automobile exception is as broad as one authorized
by warrant. 16 3 Thus, all containers which could house the item
sought may be searched." 6 Justice Stevens' view of the breadth of
warrantless searches imperils all remaining limitations.
Early in its development the analytical framework for the search
of containers found in vehicles under the automobile exception ad-
hered to fourth amendment principles. The early cases properly fo-
cused their fourth amendment treatment on the containers
themselves and the suspect's legitimate expectation of privacy in
them. Now, that framework has been manipulated by the Supreme
Court to a point where the automobile and its contents are function-
ally one and the same. Recent cases evince a readiness to ignore
distinctions, declaring in Ross, that a search under the automobile
exception may be as broad as a search with a warrant, extending to
all parts of an automobile and all containers therein. This clear
trend repudiates the Court's own principle that the initial intrusion
and the scope of a search are not the same and must be justified on
separate grounds.
II. THE 1985 AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION DECISIONS
The 1985 automobile exception cases are remarkable: in Castle-
berry, a tie vote affirming a lower court decision, there is no opinion;
in Johns, where seven members of the Court joined the majority
opinion, the Court offered no plausible rationale for its decision;
and in Carney, the rationale put forth resurrected one put to rest
only three years earlier. Two trends emerge from these cases. First,
there is no doctrinal support for the anomalous treatment accorded
automobile searches, and second, the Supreme Court majority at
times does not even risk attempting to fashion doctrinal support for
its automobile exception decisions.
A. California v. Carney
In Carney the automobile exception met and mastered the spe-
162. "We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need
for warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles." Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979).
163. "we hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by that exception is no
broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant." Ross,
456 U.S. at 825.
164. Id.
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cial privacy interest normally recognized in a dwelling.1 65  In an-
swering the reasoned approach of the California Supreme Court,166
the United States Supreme Court ignored its own conclusion in
Ross that the rationale of the reduced expectation of privacy attend-
ant upon vehicles was unreasoned and no longer applicable.167  The
Court applied only one narrow prong of its automobile privacy ra-
tionale to reach this result. 168 Carney stands as an example of the
lengths the Court appears willing to go in order to fit more warrant-
less searches within the rubric of the automobile exception.
A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent received an
uncorroborated tip that a person was exchanging marijuana for sex
in a motor home parked on a San Diego street.1 69 The agent ob-
served the defendant approach a youth and accompany him to a
Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot.'70 The defendant
and the youth drew all of the window shades in the motor home,
including a shade covering the front windshield.' 7 ' The motor
home was kept under surveillance for a short time by DEA
165. Ordinarily, the highest fourth amendment protection extends to anything acting as a
home or residence. In what has become the classic example of this concept, Justice Brennan
in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958), quoted William Pitt's remarks made
during a Parliamentary debate on searches incident to the enforcement of an excise tax on
cider:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; it's roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares
not cross the threshhold of the ruined tenement.
See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1971) ("[P]hysical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed."); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 885 (6th Cir. 1972) ("The concept that a
man's home is his castle is an ancient one. It has had a profound effect upon our legal
history. Its application to the innocent and guilty, the rich and the poor is no figment of the
imagination of modem-day judges.").
166. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983).
167. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069 (1985).
168. The privacy analysis typically involves a three-prong test. See Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979). First, the court looks to the "use," that is, whether the area
searched is employed in such a way as to indicate an expectation of privacy. The second
prong involves "configuration," that is, whether the object is so configured or structured as to
indicate a privacy expectation. The third prong of the privacy test asks whether the object is
so "pervasively regulated" that it indicates little expectation of privacy. In Carney, the
Court applied only the pervasive regulation prong. The Court could not employ the use
prong because one has high expectations of privacy in a vehicle utilized as a home. More-
over, the configuration prong of the test runs counter to the Court's argument since a mobile
home with blinds drawn admits no diminished expectation of privacy.
169. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
170. Id.
171. Id
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agents. 17 2 The youth then left the motor home and was stopped by
the agents.1 73 The young man told the agents that the defendant
had given him marijuana in exchange for sex.174 At the direction of
the DEA agents, the young man returned to the mobile home and
knocked on the door.175 The defendant stepped out of the mobile
home and was immediately arrested. 176 One agent entered the mo-
bile home and observed marijuana and related items on a table.177
The mobile home was seized and transported to a police station
where a second warrantless search uncovered additional marijuana
in cupboards and the refrigerator. 178
The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that the automobile exception is inapplicable to a motor home.' 7 9
After reviewing the automobile exception cases from Carroll to
Ross, the California court concluded that the mobility discussed in
Carroll and relied upon in the later cases could not possibly be the
sole basis for allowing warrantless searches of immobilized vehicles.
Consequently, this court relied upon post-Carroll and pre-Ross ra-
tionales of the United States Supreme Court in determining that
"the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the auto-
mobile"' 80 is the basis for distinguishing between warrantless
searches of residences and vehicles. The California court ruled that
the principal function of the motor home was to provide living
quarters and therefore was not properly subject to the diminished
expectation of privacy normally attendant upon automobiles.' 8'
The court concluded: "For these reasons, it is entitled to a degree
of protection similar to that accorded an Englishman's cottage, or
'ruined tenement'."'182
The California court acknowledged that the motor home could
properly be the subject of a warrantless search under another excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, such as if exigent circumstances
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
180. Id. at 605, 668 P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504 (citing United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)); People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 418, 591 P.2d 514, 519, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 224, 227-28 (1979).
181. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 668 P.2d at 812-13, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06.
182. Id. at 607, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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could be established."8 3 On that basis the court proceeded to review
the state's claim that the original intrusion was a protective sweep
of the premises to look for other suspects who might pose a threat
to the arresting officers or who might seek to destroy evidence lo-
cated in the motor home.184 Applying the normal constitutional
rule that the party seeking exemption from fourth amendment pro-
cedures bears the burden of justifying the warrantless intrusion, the
California Supreme Court concluded that the state failed to show
articulable facts from which the officers could reasonably have in-
ferred that other suspects were in the motor home."8 5
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that a mo-
tor home is subject to search under the automobile exception. A
mobile home is not to be treated like a residence for fourth amend-
ment purposes.1
8 6
Retreating somewhat from the Court's strident position ad-
vanced in Ross in 1982, Chief Justice Burger stated that "[t]he ca-
pacity to be 'quickly moved' was clearly the basis of the holding in
Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready mobility
as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception."'1 7 Of
course, all of the post-Carroll cases cited as support for this proposi-
tion involved cases in which the Court was sanctioning either
delayed searches or searches of immobilized vehicles. 88 Since the
California court had questioned the applicability of mobility as a
factor for the warrantless search of an immobilized vehicle, the
Chief Justice resurrected the diminished expectation of privacy as
secondary grounds in support of the automobile exception, 189 a
complete reversal from the position advanced in Ross only three
183. Id. at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
184. Id. at 610-13, 668 P.2d at 814-16, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507-09.
185. Id. at 612, 668 P.2d at 816-17, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
186. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071 n.3.
We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to a motor home that
is situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a
residence. Among the factors that might be relevant in determining whether a war-
rant would be required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the vehicle is
readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is
licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to
a public road.
Id
187. Id at 2069.
188. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 366 (1976) (search at impound lot); Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588 (1974) (exterior of car examined at impound lot); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 437 (1973) (delayed search at private garage); Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42, 43 (1970) (search of automobile while driven to police station); Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 58 (1967) (search of automobile one week after impounding).
189. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2069.
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years earlier. The Ross Court retreated because the privacy ration-
ale simply would not allow the extension of the automobile excep-
tion to containers found in a vehicle.19 The Court rejected the
privacy rationale in Ross, only to return to it again in Carney. In
support of treating the mobile home as a vehicle rather than a
dwelling, the Court applied only one prong of the revived privacy
analysis.'9 1 The majority stated that every vehicle is subject to per-
vasive regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. 92 In finding this
reduced expectation of privacy the Court failed to apply the princi-
pal tests which accompany any privacy analysis: the type of facil-
ity, conduct normally conducted in such a setting, 193 and the steps
taken by the occupants to protect their privacy. The Court claimed
such distinctions would require the differentiation between "wor-
thy" and "unworthy" vehicles, an analysis which Chief Justice Bur-
ger claimed was rejected in Ross.'9 4 Underlying the application of
only part of the privacy test was the poorly established assumption
that automobiles are subject to more pervasive regulation than resi-
dences. Traffic codes are not necessarily more complex than build-
ing and housing codes. In some communities, homes, not motor
vehicles, are subject to more comprehensive and intrusive periodic
state health and safety inspections. 195
Even though it ignored the holding eliminating the reduced ex-
pectation of privacy, the Court returned to Ross to use the exigency
of an automobile's mobility and the attendant impracticability of
securing a warrant to justify the warrantless search. The Court
again spoke of actual, rather than inherent, mobility,'96 but it added
no additional meaning or greater understanding because the deci-
sion failed to differentiate between the initial search on the street
and the second, delayed search at the police station. The Court
stressed that even though the mobile home possessed some attrib-
190. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 47.
192. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2069 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41
(1973)).
193. E.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741-43 (1984) (whether setting was
used for "intimate activities" is factor in determining whether society recognized a privacy
interest).
194. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
195. See supra note 101.
196. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070:
[Tihe vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the exception laid down in Carroll and
applied in succeeding cases. Like the automobile in Carroll, respondent's motor
home was readily mobile. Absent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily
have been moved beyond the reach of the police.
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utes of a conventional home, its presence on the street, its ready
mobility and the "pervasive schemes of regulation" 197 affecting all
automotive traffic resulted in a diminished expectation of privacy.
The automobile exception has travelled far from the "grave
emergency" 198 of exigent circumstances to general impracticability.
Throughout that journey the Supreme Court has thwarted the inter-
ests protected by the fourth amendment. Even though the Court
previously rejected mere police inconvenience as an inadequately
protective standard, 199 the current standard, presumed impractica-
bility, without even a showing of actual impracticability, is far more
lax. The current standard derives from a mentality that admits no
value in the prior judicial approval involved in the warrant process
and is unconcerned about controlling the exercise of police discre-
tion. This mentality finds a police officer's assessment of probable
cause to be an adequate alternative to a magistrate's warrant, a clear
repudiation of central fourth amendment values.
In Carney, the Court justifies the automobile exception on a di-
minished expectation of privacy that occurs in automobiles and the
presumed impracticability of obtaining a warrant before searching a
mobile home. Pervasive regulation is offered as an explanation of
the privacy rationale, yet it fails to demonstrate a coherent relation-
ship between warrantless searches and license tags, worn tires and
broken headlamps.200 Impracticability is based on the inherent mo-
bility of automobiles. This falls on the failure to distinguish be-
tween roadside searches and delayed searches at impound lots or
police headquarters. So long as these inexplicable rationales persist,
the warrant requirement generally, not just as it pertains to
automobiles, is at risk. The skepticism about the value of warrants
demonstrated in the automobile exception cases must ultimately
spill over and affect the Court's consideration of the warrant re-
quirement in all contexts. Even homes may not be immune from
this reasoning.
197. Id.; see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (lower expectation of
privacy due to extensive regulation and greater number of police-citizen contacts concerning
automobiles).
198. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
199. "No reason, except inconvenience of the officers and delay in preparing papers and
getting before a magistrate, appears for the failure to seek a search warrant. But those rea-
sons are no justification for by-passing the constitutional requirement. ... Id
200. Moreover, a homeowner must observe zoning requirements, pay property taxes, and
keep his residence up to code standards; yet no one would suggest that these regulations
result in a lower expectation of privacy.
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B. Oklahoma v. Castleberry
In Oklahoma v. Castleberry,20 1 the Supreme Court affirmed a
limitation on the automobile exception that appears unstable be-
cause of the tie vote as well as the rapidity with which other limita-
tions have fallen. This limitation appears absurd on its face when
considered in the context of the current scope of the automobile
exception. Although this limitation is in need of modification, it is
nonetheless more consistent with fourth amendment principles than
the remainder of the case law defining the scope of the automobile
exception.
A confidential informant notified Oklahoma City police that
two men who were staying at a named motel and driving a blue
Thunderbird bearing Florida license plates were carrying narcotics
in blue suitcases.2°2 Acting pursuant to the tip, an officer proceeded
to the motel, observed the described car and confirmed with the
desk clerk that a room was rented to someone named Castle-
berry. 0 3 The appellants then left the motel room and placed sev-
eral suitcases in the trunk of the vehicle.2" The officer identified
himself and approached the two men, carrying his badge in one
hand and his gun in the other.2" 5 The officer ordered the appellants
to place their hands on the top of the automobile. One complied,
but Castleberry resisted, closing the trunk, throwing a small white
object into the car and then shutting and locking the car door.20 6
Back-up assistance arrived and opened the trunk of the car with
keys removed from the door. 0 7 The officers searched the suitcases
found in the trunk and discovered narcotics.20 The officers also
searched the interior of the car and discovered the small white ob-
ject, a Band-Aid box, containing cocaine.20 9
The state argued that the search of the suitcases found in the
trunk of the car and the Band-Aid box found in the passenger com-
partment of the vehicle were justified either as incident to a lawful
arrest or under the ubiquitous automobile exception.210 The
201. 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
202. Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720, 722 (1984), afl'd mem. per curiam by an equally
divided court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
203. Castleberry, 678 P.2d at 722.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 723.
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found both contentions
groundless. At the time the suitcases and the interior of the car
were searched, both arrestees were restrained.211 The car doors and
trunk were locked, and there was no danger that the arrestees could
obtain a weapon or evidence from the interior of the vehicle.212 As
to the automobile exception, the Oklahoma court found as control-
ling, the limitation to the exception, formulated in Sanders and re-
tained in Ross, that the authority to conduct a warrantless search
does not apply to situations where probable cause exists to search a
specific container before it is placed in the vehicle. The officers were
only entitled to seize the suitcases and Band-Aid box while a search
warrant was obtained.2"3 An evenly divided United States Supreme
Court affirmed the decision without opinion.214
Given the considerable blurring that has befallen the Chimel
standard, it was not surprising that the State of Oklahoma sug-
gested that the search of the suitcases placed in the trunk of the
vehicle and the Band-Aid box thrown into the interior of the auto-
mobile was incident to the suspects' arrest.21 5 Several factors sug-
gested to state authorities that this alternative ground to the
automobile exception would be accepted by the Supreme Court.
The central question presented was whether control would be mea-
sured at the moment that the officers sought to intercept the defend-
ants. At that time, the Band-Aid box was in hand and the suitcases
within grabbing distance. Had the Band-Aid box been secured by
the officer and searched simultaneously with the arrest, there is little
doubt that the Court would have upheld the search as incident to
the arrest. In that case, police would have had exclusive control of
neither the arrest situation nor the Band-Aid box.216 While the
same argument could be made regarding the suitcases, it would be
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 724.
214. Castleberry, 105 S. Ct. at 1859.
215. See Brief for Petitioner State of Oklahoma in Support of Petition for Certiorari at
13-14, Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Peti-
tioner].
In his dissent in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 23 (1976), Justice Blackmun
suggested an alternative ground for the search. He suggested that the footlocker could have
been searched incident to the suspects' arrest when the footlocker sat in the open trunk of the
stationary automobile. Perhaps such logic could have been applied to the Castleberry situa-
tion to justify the search as incident to arrest. However, in Castleberry, the items were locked
in a trunk, and once the officer obtained the keys, the items were not under the suspects'
control. Brief for Petitioner, at 8-9.
216. When, as in Castleberry, the police have control of the package as well as control of
the arrest situation, no justification for foregoing the warrant requirement exists.
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more tenuous. It was not necessary that the officer possess the suit-
cases to ensure that the arrestees were deprived of their control. In
fact, a search of the suitcases during the moments surrounding the
arrest would have distracted the officer from assuring his own safety
by attending to the evidence rather than the arrestees. A search at
that moment would not serve the societal purposes which permit a
warrantless search incident to arrest. Instead, a contemporaneous
search would have detracted from those purposes as in Belton.
There, the four suspects' most opportune moment to escape or
threaten the single arresting officer presented itself when the officer
turned his attention from the suspects to search the automobile.21
The difficulty with Castleberry is that once the officers finally
subdued the suspects, the Band-Aid box was locked behind the au-
tomobile's doors. Although the Band-Aid box might have been le-
gitimately searched a moment earlier, once it was locked in the
automobile, it was beyond the suspects' control. Belton would not
apply because the arrestees were not recent occupants of the auto-
mobile. Belton does not apply, that is, unless it altered the Chimel
control test in general, rather than merely devising a test that ap-
plies just for searches following the arrests of recent occupants of
automobiles.
The Supreme Court's four-four tie vote affirming the Oklahoma
court's rejection of the state's position hardly provides meaningful
guidance in this area. It is too easy to dismiss Belton as relevant
only to automobiles, despite Justice Stewart's admonishment that
the case was just that.218 There is no conceivable justification for a
separate rule that extends search incident to arrest to the interior
compartment of an automobile once an arrestee is deprived of con-
trol but not to any other location. The ability to lock the doors of
the compartment provides support for the opposite rule. It appears
easier to deprive an arrestee of the opportunity to reach or grab into
the interior compartment of a vehicle than it is to deprive him of
reaching or grabbing opportunities in most other settings. Belton
may be the first step of an as-of-yet incomplete redrafting of the
Chimel control test. Belton is not the only generalization adopted
by the Court in this decade which results in the removal of limita-
217. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). After ordering the suspects from the car,
the arresting officer patted down the four men and directed them to four separate locations on
the highway. Id. at 456.
218. "Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's princi-
ples in this particular and problematic context [the automobile]." Id. at 460 n.3 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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tions upon searches incident to arrest.219 It may very well be the
first step to the adoption of a general rule further enhancing police
authority following arrests outside of the home.
Reviewing Castleberry as an automobile exception case reveals
the one imperiled limitation that the Court left in Ross by failing to
overrule Sanders.220 Police still may not rely upon the broad war-
rant exemption for automobiles to search containers found in a ve-
hicle when the probable cause focused upon the containers prior to
being placed in the automobile. 221 The narrow vote in Castleberry
would indicate that this limitation will soon fall to the unrelenting
expansion of the automobile exception.
C. United States v. Johns222
Johns is one in what is now a long line of examples where law
enforcement officers have elected to bypass the warrant process and
conduct a search without prior judicial approval and without any
conceivable need to do so. It is also typical of a lengthening line of
cases in which the Supreme Court has ratified the police decision,
thereby relegating the warrant process in searches taking place
outside of homes and offices to an historical anachronism.
During a United States Customs investigation of suspected drug
smugglers, two pickup trucks were observed by ground and air sur-
veillance travelling to a remote private airstrip in Arizona not far
from the Mexican border.223 Soon after the arrival of the pickups at
the airstrip two small planes landed and departed after rendezvous-
ing with the occupants of the trucks.224 The Customs* officers ap-
proached the trucks and observed several sealed boxes and plastic
bales inside smelling of marijuana.225 The officers arrested the five
219. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (holding that an arresting officer
has the unfettered right to remain at the side of an arrestee, even if the officer does so for
reasons other than to protect himself or to deny the arrestee access to evidence).
220. "Although we have rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our
holding in that case .... " United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
221. Indeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal
items when one wishes to transport them. Accordingly, the reasons for not requir-
ing a warrant for the search of an automobile do not apply to searches of personal
luggage taken by police from automobiles. We therefore find no justification for the
extension of Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search of one's personal
luggage merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the
police.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1979) (footnote omitted).
222. United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
223. Id at 883.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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defendants present at the scene and seized the boxes and bags from
the trucks.2 2 6 The Customs officers then took the trucks to DEA
headquarters and removed the bales, placing them in a warehouse.
Three days later, still without a search warrant, officers opened the
bales and found marijuana.22 7
The government contended that the warrantless search of the
wrapped bales could be supported either under the plain view ex-
ception 228 or the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The trial court suppressed the evidence, and the decision was af-
firmed by the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court of
appeals concluded that the officers were entitled to search the vehi-
cles under the rules of the automobile exception set forth in Ross,
which permits a search of the vehicle at the scene or shortly thereaf-
ter. The court of appeals held that the exception did not justify a
warrantless search of a container no longer in an automobile and
secured by the police three days prior to the warrantless search.2 29
The United States Supreme Court reversed and upheld the
search on the theory that it would be of little benefit to the person
whose property was searched nor would it promote fourth amend-
ment interests to limit the automobile exception to searches at the
scene or shortly thereafter. 230 The Court concluded that a delayed
search, even one delayed by three days, was not necessarily
unreasonable.231
In Johns, the Court reached a low in opinion craftmanship. The
majority opinion relied upon Carroll, Ross and three earlier per
curiam decisions2 32 which also extended the automobile exception
226. Id.
227. Id. at 884.
228. United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 881
(1985). The plain view doctrine as applicable to automobiles is ellucidated in Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744 (1983) (officer conducting routine driver's license check observed
balloons and vials of white powder in defendant's car; held, seizure of these items lawful
because they were in plain view of officer lawfully in position to see the contraband).
229. Johns, 707 F.2d at 1100.
230. Johns, 105 S. Ct. at 886.
231. Id. at 887.
232. In Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that if probable
cause to search car at scene exists, such probable cause still exists shortly thereafter at police
station), the Court, while relying on Chambers to justify the search, ignored the facts in
Chambers which made a subsequent warrantless search at the station reasonable. In Michi-
gan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam) (involving the inventory search of car
towed, after its occupants were arrested), the Court, while denying that immobilization of the
car has any effect on the warrantless search, simply cited Texas v. White and Chambers for
support. In Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1853 (1984) (per curiam) (involving police
entry into a locked, secure impound area eight hours after owner's arrest to conduct warrant-
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without advancing reasons for the extensions. Ross was based upon
the general impracticability of securing a search warrant prior to
the search of vehicles and their contents.233 Thus, the rationale of
Ross is absolutely irrelevant to Johns, where the government could
not show need, slight inconvenience or indeed any semblance of im-
practicability to justify foregoing a warrant before searching a
container safely secured for three days.
Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Johns is typical of the shift in
fourth amendment analysis which now prevails in the Supreme
Court. The analysis requires that the one who would maintain the
status quo and preserve existing fourth amendment protection must
bear the burden of demonstrating how that furthers fourth amend-
ment interests.234 Formerly, the burden rested upon the party seek-
ing exemption from the warrant requirement to demonstrate a need
to bypass normal constitutional procedures.235 Johns builds where
Ross left off, indicating that the automobile exception's breadth is
inexhaustible. Allowing the search three days after the seizure
while the packages were safely stored in a government facility indi-
cates that time limitations upon warrantless searches no longer ex-
ist. The scope of such searches is limitless, no longer linked in any
way to the societal need which originally justified the exception's
existence. The Court in Ross held that a search under the automo-
bile exception is as broad as a search authorized by a magistrate.236
Then, the Court in Johns authorized delayed warrantless searches
of a vehicle's contents without requiring the government to show
less search), the Court again merely cited to Thomas and Chambers for the proposition that
"the justification to conduct... a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been
immobilized."
233. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982).
234. Cf United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), where the majority held that
proponents of the exclusion of evidence should demonstrate how that remedy promotes
fourth amendment rights.
[Tihe argument that defendants will lose their incentive to litigate meritorious
Fourth Amendment claims as a result of the good-faith exception we adopt today is
unpersuasive. Although the exception might discourage presentation of insubstan-
tial motions, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on defendants by a successful
motion makes it unlikely that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially
diminished.
Id at 3422 n.25.
The assignment of the burden of proof can be issue determinative. This is very different
from placing the burden of proof upon the individual or agency seeking a court's sanction for
failing to secure a warrant in a particular fact situation. There, the individual or agency can
rely upon the facts in attempting to demonstrate the need for bypassing the warrant process.
235. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (those seeking exemption
from warrant requirement must show need for exemption).
236. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
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any reason whatsoever for the delay or the failure to secure a magis-
trate's prior authorization. Consequently, the failure to secure a
warrant for a delayed search does not even require a showing of
inconvenience.
III. THE IMPORT OF THE 1985 DECISIONS
The automobile search cases of 1985 signified more than the
mere expansion of the already general exemption granted to
automobiles from the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
After all, the two cases-Johns and Carney-in which the Supreme
Court upheld warrantless intrusions under the automobile excep-
tion had next to nothing to do with automobiles. Moreover, the
decision in Castleberry cannot be read as an endorsement of limita-
tions on the automobile exception.
The use of the automobile exception as the framework in which
to decide these cases was only a matter of convenience. By the time
the officers in Johns opened and inspected the contents of the pack-
ages stored in the DEA warehouse, the packages' link to the trucks
was merely a matter of historical curiosity. Similarly, in Carney,
the critical fact is not that the search was of a mobile home parked
on a public street. The search invaded an entity recognized as a
home, a clearly recognized privacy interest,237 but located in an
area not normally used to conduct housekeeping. There is no es-
caping the California court's conclusion that it was a home despite
its being on wheels.23 Moreover, the Supreme Court did not
237. As the dissenters in Carney wrote: "[T]he place to be searched plays an important
role in Fourth Amendment analysis .... The California Supreme Court correctly charac-
terized this vehicle as a 'hybrid' which combines 'the mobility attribute of an automobile...
with most of the privacy characteristics of a house.'" California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066,
2071 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (quoting in part, People v. Carney,
34 Cal. 3d 597, 606, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (1983)). See also Segura v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3389 (1984) ("The sanctity of the home is not to be disputed.
But the home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupant's
possessory interests in the premises, but because of their privacy interests in the activities that
take place within.").
238. The California Supreme Court found that:
[f]irst and foremost, unlike an automobile the primary function of a motor home is
not transportation. Motor homes are generally designed and used as residences;
their essential purpose is to provide the occupant with living quarters. . . . The
motor home at issue here. . . created a setting that could accommodate most pri-
vate activities normally conducted in a fixed home. The configuration of the fur-
nishings, together with the use of the motor home for all manner of strictly personal
purposes, strongly suggests that the structure at issue is more properly treated as a
residence than a mere automobile.
People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 606-07, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (1983)
(footnote omitted).
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choose to distinguish between the immediate search on the street
and the delayed search at the police station. At least with the first
search, the Court could have disputed the California Supreme
Court's finding and contrived exigent circumstances.23 9
In all three 1985 automobile exception decisions, there was ab-
solutely no need for a warrantless search.24  The packages seized
in Johns were stored for three days by law enforcement officers in a
law enforcement facility maintained for secure storage. In Carney,
the motor home was safely and exclusively under police control
once the defendant exited the vehicle and once the youth presuma-
bly assured the police that no one else was inside. To rationalize
either search through the automobile exception is to disguise what
the Court is actually doing. Claiming that an automobile was at
some time or another involved does not explain, let alone justify,
disregard of the constitutional principle that warrants are the only
way to protect the privacy of the innocent as well as the guilty. As
recently as 1979 the Court itself acknowledged that the incidental
involvement of an auto does not justify ignoring the warrant re-
quirement.241 The Court continues to act as though the word "au-
239. The California Supreme Court stated: "The underlying rationale for the protective
sweep doctrine is, of course, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment." Id. at 612, 668 P.2d at 816, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 509. The court found that the requisite
exigencies did not exist because the letter which tipped off the police was uncorroborated.
The reference to the would-be accomplice did not place him inside the motor home. The
mobile home had been under surveillance for an hour, during which time only the defendant
and the youth had been observed going in or coming out. Further, none of the arresting
officers testified that they had subjectively believed that others were inside. Id at 612-13, 668
P.2d at 816, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
It is conceivable that the United States Supreme Court might have made a more plausible
justification for the search had they focused on the exigencies surrounding the sweep search
rather than the implausible, hybrid application of an automobile exception analysis. By sim-
ply finding the California Court's exigency analysis erroneous, the setting of a dubious prece-
dent could have been avoided.
240. At the time of the searches in all three cases, the suspects were in police custody,
thus eliminating any threat to the evidence of the type which might justify an on-the-spot
warrantless search. In Johns, the contraband was safely secured in a DEA warehouse at the
time of the search. United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881, 884 (1985). In Carney, the motor
home was impounded at the time of the second search. California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. at
2066, 2067 (1985). The California Supreme Court rejected any contention by the state that
the first search was a sweep for others in the mobile home. People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597,
610-13, 668 P.2d 807, 814-17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 507-10 (1983). In Castleberry, the suspect
had been subdued at the time of the car search. Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720, 722
(1984).
241. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1979):
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need
for warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles. . .. Accord-
ingly, as a general rule there is no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage
taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.
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tomobile" has a mesmerizing effect and that the involvement of a
vehicle anywhere in the process is sufficient explanation for the dis-
regard of orderly constitutional procedures. Mere repetition is be-
ing offered as a substitute for reason.
The most recent cases stand for very little other than to rein-
force certain truisms established in previous automobile cases. The
constantly shifting arguments offered in support of the automobile
exception do not explain in any way a vehicle's total exemption
from the warrant requirement. The John's opinion minimized mo-
bility. It had to do so to uphold a search of the packages three days
after their seizure. Instead, the majority relied upon the vague ru-
bric of impracticability and three earlier per curiam opinions,242
none of which offered an explanation or justification for their expan-
sion of the automobile exemption. The Carney majority, on the
other hand, returned to and stressed mobility because the motor
home met all the privacy expectations ordinarily associated with a
residence. Chief Justice Burger also revived the reduced expecta-
tion of privacy because the mobile home is subject to the pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of travelling on highways. Pervasive
regulation, however, does not justify ignoring the privacy expecta-
tions ordinarily associated with living arrangements, and the pri-
vacy argument was a feeble and ineffective response to the
California court's analysis of the issue. 43 Mobility works neither to
justify the extreme delay in Johns nor to overcome the normal ex-
pectation of privacy associated with living arrangements in Carney.
Moreoever, just as the Court has not explained why regulation of
automobiles overcomes privacy interests in trunks and locked glove
compartments it did not explain how regulation diminished the pri-
vacy interest in a mobile home.
Mobility cannot be used to understand the Court's differing
treatment of personal effects seized from an automobile and those
effects seized in any other public setting. In the latter case, the po-
lice must secure a warrant before searching the effects. In the for-
mer, there can be a three-day impounding prior to a still
warrantless search. Nor does mobility serve to distinguish a vehicle
from any container found in a vehicle. 2' There is no constitution-
ally relevant way that a suitcase is less mobile than an automobile.
242. Florida v. Myers, 104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982);
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See supra note 232 and accompanying text (for a discus-
sion of per curiam opinions).
243. Supra note 200 and accompanying text.
244. Supra notes 112-64 and accompanying text.
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The mobility rationale, however, is not totally without value. It
serves, as it did in United States v. Carroll sixty years ago, to explain
why an automobile stopped on a public highway may sometimes be
searched without a warrant. The mobility of the vehicle created the
exigent circumstance which in Carroll served as the legitimate soci-
etal interest which excused the investigating officers from obtaining
a warrant prior to conducting the search. Had the officers delayed
the search to obtain a warrant the opportunity to search would have
been irretrievably lost. Recent cases have substituted inherent mo-
bility, somehow upholding searches in Johns after a three-day delay
and in Carney after police had control of the vehicle and moved it to
the police station. Inherent mobility, it seems, has given way to an
even vaguer and less limiting term, general impracticability.245
General notions about the difficulty of towing and safekeeping
an automobile24" while a warrant is sought may, upon superficial
analysis, lead to acceptance of an argument that general impractica-
bility supports the warrantless search of automobiles.24 This argu-
ment is based upon a generality which may apply in a remote
desert248 but, if applied uniformly, has the effect of curtailing consti-
245. "Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of secur-
ing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods." United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1981) (footnote omitted).
246. In Chambers, if the Court had required seizure and holding of the vehicle, it
would have imposed a constitutional requirement upon police departments of all
sizes around the country to have available the people and equipment necessary to
transport impounded automobiles to some central location until warrants could be
secured. Moreover, once seized automobiles were taken from the highway the po-
lice would be responsible for providing some appropriate location where they could
be kept, with due regard to the safety of the vehicles and their contents, until a
magistrate ruled on the application for a warrant. Such a constitutional require-
ment therefore would have imposed severe, even impossible, burdens on many po-
lice departments. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 835, 841-42 (1974). No comparable burdens are likely to exist with
respect to the seizure of personal luggage.
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14 (1979).
247. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925):
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant. ...
248. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted):
Courts, including this Court, often make the rather casual assumption that police
are not substantially frustrated in their efforts to apprehend those whom they have
probable cause to arrest or to gather evidence of a crime when they have probable
cause to search by the judicially created preference for a warrant, apparently assum-
ing that the typical case is one in which an officer can make a quick half mile ride to
the nearest precinct station in an urban area to obtain such a warrant. . . . But
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tutional protection throughout the country. It may be used to jus-
tify even those delayed searches in cases where the police experience
no difficulty towing and safekeeping the vehicle and find it desirable
to do so. 249 Acceptance of the argument concerning the vehicle it-
self does not allow for its application to personal effects taken from
the vehicle. Such items can be transported and secured at the police
station while a warrant is sought as easily as any other similar item
seized anywhere else."' The fact that it comes from an automobile
provides no greater justification for the warrantless search.
If impracticability is the reed on which the exception currently
stands, it is indeed a fragile one. Its lack of reason is personified in
Johns. For if it can be said that it was impracticable to obtain a
warrant to search the packages seized three days earlier and stored
in a DEA warehouse, then it is always impracticable to obtain a
search warrant, no matter the circumstances.
Impracticability serves the Court's purposes because it is more
practical and functional a term than mobility. It has never been
defined and thus lacks limitation. It has been used to uphold
searches where the only conceivable impracticability in obtaining a
search warrant was mild inconvenience, previously held insufficient
as an excuse for not obtaining a warrant.251 Moreover, it flies in the
face of the intent of the framers of the fourth amendment who
sought to interpose inconvenience between a citizen's privacy and
this casual assumption simply does not fit the realities of sparsely populated "cow
counties" located in some of the Southern and Western States, where at least apoc-
ryphally the number of cows exceeds the number of people and the number of
square miles in the county may exceed 10,000 and the nearest magistrate may be 25
or even 50 miles away.
249. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), the Court upheld a search of a car
which was towed to a garage. The damaged car was towed because it was a "nuisance."
Police officers justified the search for the defendant-police officer's gun on the grounds that
they feared vandals would obtain it. During the search, police found evidence incriminating
the defendant in a murder. No mention was made of the possibility of towing the vehicle to
the police station. The Court merely concluded "that the type of caretaking 'search' con-
ducted here of a vehicle that was neither in custody nor on the premises of its owner, and that
had been placed where it was by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely
because a warrant had not been obtained." Id at 447-48.
250. Compare Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 756 (1979) (warrant necessary for
search of closed container not part of automobile search itself) and United States v. Mon-
clavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981) (purse of passenger in automobile seized,
invalidated warrantless search at police station one hour later) with Brett v. United States,
412 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1969) (warrantless search of defendant's clothes held in property
room for three days held improper).
251. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971): "The warrant require-
ment has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenience
to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency."
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the ability of government agents to disturb that privacy.2 52 The de-
mise of exigent circumstances and the substitution of general catch-
all terms is continuing evidence that the present Supreme Court ma-
jority holds the warrant to be an unnecessary tool for controlling
the exercise of police discretion in public encounters with
citizens.25 3
None of the three 1985 automobile exception cases presented a
credible situation for finding that exigent circumstances actually ex-
isted to justify a warrantless search. Of those three, the facts in
Castleberry came the closest to presenting an exigent circumstance,
but that was the one case where the Court affirmed the state court
decision disallowing the search in reliance on the Sanders limita-
tion. In the one case thus presenting a semblance of an exigency
argument, the police decision to search was not upheld. In Johns
and Carney where no conceivable necessity or even inconvenience
argument could be advanced, the warrantless searches were al-
lowed. The state of fourth amendment law and especially the auto-
mobile exception is that the case adhering more closely to
established constitutional principles appears out of line because of
repeated failure to adhere to those principles.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reasoning which led to the result in Castleberry, though un-
stated, is desirable because it is fully consistent with traditional
fourth amendment jurisprudence. There was no need for an imme-
diate warrantless search of the suitcases or Band-Aid box. There-
fore, the warrantless search was not permitted. Obviously, the
result does not rest upon a necessity test because that test has been
so eroded that, for all intents and purposes, it no longer exists. The
Castleberry result rests squarely and perilously upon Sanders, the
remaining limitation on the automobile exception. By itself, di-
vorced from a necessity test, this limitation makes no more sense
than the unlimited breadth of the exception itself. True, there was
252. A classic reading of the fourth amendment can be found in Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948):
Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to
society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right
of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and free-
dom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent.
253. Some members of the court have demonstrated a cavalier attitude in disregarding
the warrant requirement. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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no need for a warrantless search, but the automobile exception no
longer rests on need. Instead, the exception rests on the intellectual
mush variously described as "general impracticability" and a com-
bination of other equally meaningless phrases. The fourth amend-
ment has been supplanted by a set of presumptions and fictions for
the professed purpose of providing guidance to police officers, 254
when the factual contexts being decided rarely conform to the pre-
sumptions upon which the rules rely. Instead of determinations
based upon the facts of each case, the amendment's warrant re-
quirement has been nullified by generalities which exist for the sin-
gle purpose of reducing the amendment's impact upon criminal
litigation and, thus, upon how police behave in our society.
A Supreme Court at full strength is likely to reconsider and al-
ter the Sanders-Castleberry rule. What form that change takes will
clearly dictate the breadth of major impending changes to the war-
rant requirement. A limited modification bringing the rule into line
with the rest of the automobile exception would be consistent with
the Court's claim that automobiles are different and merit different
treatment. Such a modification of the Sanders-Castleberry rule
might allow an immediate warrantless search of containers found in
automobiles suspected of carrying contraband. In Castleberry, the
officer attempted to arrest the suspects and seize the items as soon
as he confirmed the facts of the tip on which he was acting. 255
Under the likely modification of Sanders-Castleberry, this search
would be upheld. A limitation consistent with the rule at present
would allow police to search containers in cars where probable
cause exists to search the contents of those containers, but only
where the facts demonstrate that the officer did not delay in order to
defeat the warrant demand.
Obviously, even this proposed modification of the Sanders-Cas-
tieberry reasoning, like the automobile exception, deviates from
traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence in that it would allow a
warrantless search where one is unnecessary. It is proposed in rec-
ognition that necessity is no longer a consideration when determin-
ing the scope of the automobile exception. It is also offered with the
hope that adherence to this proposal would limit expansion of the
exception by excluding those situations where the officer delayed
254. See supra note I11.
255. Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720, 722 (1984). The officer in Castleberry went im-
mediately to the hotel where the alleged narcotics transfers were taking place and confirmed
the informant's tip. While the officer waited for back-up assistance, the defendants emerged
from the hotel. The officer then had to identify himself and arrest the defendants. Id.
426 [Vol. 36:375
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
the intrusion solely for the purpose of subverting fourth amendment
requirements. Sadly, the automobile exception cases offer no assur-
ance that the Supreme Court majority will even accept this minor
limitation upon the further expansion of the automobile exception.
The Court may not even agree that this limited prevention of sub-
version of the warrant requirement is indeed desirable.
A total rejection of the Sanders-Castleberry rule will inevitably
lead to a reconsideration of the proposition, previously rejected by
the Supreme Court in Chadwick, that only homes, offices and pri-
vate communications implicate interests at the core of the fourth
amendment. The government contended in Chadwick that only in
these core contexts should a determination of reasonableness turn
on whether a warrant is obtained.256 In all other contexts, the rea-
sonableness of an intrusion would turn merely on whether there was
probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct is present.
The government suggested that the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy upon which the automobile exception rests supports similar
treatment for all effects found outside of those repositories, like
homes and offices, where privacy interests are traditionally recog-
nized as deserving greater fourth amendment protection. 5 7
A general rule might state that Chimel simply is inapplicable
following an arrest in a public place, confining the protections of the
Chimel rule to the facts of that case where the arrest took place at
the defendant's home. This rule would borrow upon the lore devel-
oped around automobiles under the automobile exception and now,
after Belton, searches incident to arrest. Reliance would be placed
upon a theoretically diminished expectation of privacy that attaches
to an individual once that person is in public. Belton represented an
amalgam of two exceptions, for the fact that the search was of an
automobile played an overwhelming role. The Supreme Court's
willingness to ascribe diminished, or negligible, privacy interests in
automobiles obviously influenced Belton's redrafting of incidental
searches in this context. All of the rationales theoretically justifying
a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile serve to ex-
plain the rationale for Belton. But those rationales have never with-
stood analysis, nor do they truly distinguish an automobile from
any other regulated or inspected locale. Moreover, the actual ex-
pectation of privacy for items secured in an automobile is probably
256. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
257. See, eg., Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1735 (1984) (defendants tried to
conceal marijuana in secluded field, erected fences with no trespassing signs; held these con-
siderable steps to insure privacy did not legitimize their expectation of privacy).
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greater and under no circumstance less than an item similarly
wrapped and carried in public.
Actually, little stands between acceptance of the government's
proposed redefinition of the warrant requirement in Chadwick other
than Chief Justice Burger's denunciation of the proposal in the ma-
jority opinion in that case. Various facets of the Chadwick rule
have been eroded,258 leaving very little of the principles upon which
the rule rested. After all, no meaningful distinction can be drawn
between a personal effect, such as the footlocker in Chadwick,
seized in a public place and a footlocker or other container taken
from an automobile stopped and seized on the highway. Any justi-
fication offered for the exemption of automobiles and their contents
from the warrant requirement is equally applicable or meaningless
to every other item seized in public. It matters not which rationale
may support the automobile exception at any given moment.
The diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile seems a
strong rationale for a public place exemption, but it sheds no addi-
tional light upon these critical distinctions. Even if the vehicle itself
can somehow be the subject of diminished expectations of privacy
because of pervasive regulation and because of its primary purpose
as transportation, it is nearly impossible to understand why a
container secreted out of sight in a vehicle, whether under the seat
or inside a locked glove compartment or trunk, merits less protec-
tion than an item carried in a public place subject to theft or an
259inadvertant opening.
The third prong of the privacy analysis is configuration-
whether an item is so structured to present a legitimate expectation
of privacy. It cannot explain a diminished expectation of privacy in
the closed and locked separate compartments of a vehicle, and cer-
tainly not in a mobile home. Reason again took a back seat when
the Court in Carney purported to rationalize the warrantless search
of the mobile home not only on the basis of the trailer's mobility but
258. The Court successfully eroded much of Chadwick by upholding the search incident
to arrest in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456 (1981) (search included containers inside
interior compartment of car following arrest); and by upholding the inventory search in Illi-
nois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (delayed search at police station of defendant's
shoulder bag). In neither of these cases was there a threat of a weapon being used against the
arresting officer nor was there any threat of evidence tampering since the defendant was
already in custody.
259. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) ("Certainly the privacy interests in a
car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than in a movable container."). Conversely,
privacy interests in a movable container may be no greater than those in a locked glove
compartment.
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also because of a diminished expectation of privacy.26 °
In Carney, Chief Justice Burger analogized the distinction be-
tween "worthy automobiles" and "unworthy automobiles" to the
discredited worthy container test as a way of avoiding analysis of
the actual privacy interest in the motor home.261 The only mean-
ingful way to distinguish that house trailer, which had all of its win-
dows covered, including the front windshield, and a traditional
home is that the house trailer was in a public forum. The Court's
application in Carney of the exception to a house trailer confirms
what the Supreme Court did in Ross, and again in Johns, when it
extended the automobile exception to include an automobile's con-
tents. The exception has become a public place exception eliminat-
ing the warrant requirement for all effects found in public places.
Chadwick and the Sanders-Castleberry rules are walking corpses
that simply have not yet been laid to rest.
The notion of a public place exception to the warrant require-
ment, rather than the constantly changing automobile exception, is
consistent with this Court's belief that only within the cocoon of a
home are the intimate activities protected by the full extent of the
fourth amendment.262 Moreover, that protection is secured only so
long as one remains tightly within the cocoon. The Court is unwill-
ing to protect conduct which takes place out of the home.
Full participation in modem society increasingly involves mov-
ing one's activities into a public setting. If we wish to preserve our
society as one which promises every individual freedom from un-
warranted police interference, it is essential that our courts develop
new ways of protecting our privacy and controlling police discre-
tion, ways that provide us with maximum protection consistent
with essential law enforcement interests. We need a fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence modeled on Carroll and Chimel. The current
Court seems intent on providing instead a "bright line" jurispru-
260. The privacy analysis in Carney, however, did not extend to all three prongs of the
privacy test. See supra note 168.
261. Chief Justice Burger wrote:
In United States v. Ross, we declined to distinguish between "worthy" and "unwor-
thy" containers, noting that "the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment fore-
closes such a distinction." We decline today to distinguish between "worthy" and
"unworthy" vehicles which are either on the public roads and highways, or situated
such that it is reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a
residence.
California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) (citation omitted).
262. Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984): "Only the curtilage, and not
the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the
home."
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dence of searches focused on police convenience instead of the inter-
ests the fourth amendment was intended to protect. Since "police
convenience" has no natural bounds, we can expect to see "bright
lines" drawn around ever-increasing zones of previously protected
space. Unless the court changes its approach, it is only a matter of
time until the justices acknowledge that the automobile exception
has served only as an incubator for more far-reaching exemptions
from the warrant requirement.
